Non-proliferation and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)

The Bush Administration announced in 2006 a new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) that seeks to increase U.S. and global energy security and promote non-proliferation through the expanded use of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy to meet growing electricity demand. The key elements of GNEP include the expansion of domestic use of nuclear power; demonstration of proliferation-resistant recycling; the minimization of nuclear waste; the development of advanced burner reactors; the establishment of reliable global fuel services; the demonstration of small- and medium-scale, proliferation-resistant reactors; and the revitalization of programs for advanced nuclear safeguards. If it succeeds, the partnership would demonstrate the critical technologies needed to change the way spent nuclear fuel is managed. National and international acceptance of GNEP, as well as its success, will depend in large part on early demonstration of the technical non-proliferation elements, including advanced safeguards and proliferation resistance, of all GNEP fuel cycle elements. An enhanced, systematic, defense-in-depth approach to non-proliferation that acknowledges the changing threat space, along with the new technological possibilities opened by GNEP, is essential. The prospects for GNEP are also dependent on developments in the wider non-proliferation arena, including initiatives to strengthen the non-proliferation regime being pursued by the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Group of Eight. This paper will assess the importance of the non-proliferation elements of GNEP, the non-proliferation challenges that might arise during efforts to transition to the GNEP vision and the technological requirements for meeting those challenges. (author)