Probability of failure in BWR reactor coolant piping: Guillotine break indirectly induced by earthquakes

The requirements to design nuclear power plants for the effects of an instantaneous double-ended guillotine break (DEGB) of the reactor coolant piping have led to excessive design costs, interference with normal plant operation and maintenance, and unnecessary radiation exposure of plant maintenance personnel. This report describes an aspect of the NRC/Lawrence Livermore National laboratory-sponsored research program aimed at investigating whether the probability of DEGB in Reactor Coolant Loop Piping of nuclear power plants is acceptably small such that the requirements to design for the DEGB effects (e.g., provision of pipe whip restraints) may be removed. This study estimates the probability of indirect DEGB in Reactor Coolant piping as a consequence of seismic-induced structural failures within the containment of the GE supplied boiling water reactor at the Brunswick nuclear power plant. The median probability of indirect DEGB was estimated to be 2 x 10-8 per year. Using conservation assumptions, the 90% subjective probability value (confidence) of P/sub DEGB/ was found to be less than 5 x 10-7 per year