Method for evaluation of risk due to seismic related design and construction errors based on past reactor experience

This paper proposes a methodology for quantification of risk due to seismic related design and construction errors in nuclear power plants, based on information available on errors discovered in the past. For the purposes of this paper, an error is defined as any event that causes the seismic safety margins of a nuclear power plant to be smaller than implied by current regulatory requirements and industry common practice. Also, the actual reduction in the safety margins caused by the error will be called a deficiency. The method is based on a theoretical model of errors, called a deficiency logic diagram. First, an ultimate cause is present. This ultimate cause is consumated as a specific instance, called originating error. As originating errors may occur in actions to be applied a number of times, a deficiency generation system may be involved. Quality assurance activities will hopefully identify most of these deficiencies, requesting their disposition. However, the quality assurance program is not perfect and some operating plant deficiencies may persist, causing different levels of impact to the plant logic. The paper provides a way of extrapolating information about errors discovered in plants under construction in order to assess the risk due to errors that have not been discovered