Farewell to arms. What's blocking nuclear disarmament

In the 1960s, when the United States and Soviet Union submitted their draft non-proliferation treaty to the 18-member Disarmament Committee in Geneva, it was exactly that - a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more States. It prohibited non-nuclear weapon States from acquiring nuclear weapons and prohibited the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon States from supplying them. However, it was not possible to conclude a treaty on those terms alone. Consequently, Article IV (on peaceful nuclear cooperation) and VI (on disarmament) were added. Only on the basis of this 'bargain' could the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) come into existence. It is ironic that the nuclear-weapon States that care for their own sovereignty rights would overlook that sovereignty is also dear to other States.Today, in an era of stagnating nuclear disarmament, one hears voices from some nuclear-weapon States that the disarmament stipulation was without substance and unnecessary. They argue that non-nuclear weapon States care only about their security and nothing else. If the Treaty is perceived as losing its value, withdrawing from it might eventually be seen as a consideration. At this point, non-nuclear weapon States had believed that they shared with their nuclear-armed counterparts a solid outlook on how to proceed with the implementation of Article VI. No one had the illusion that all the steps would be strictly implemented. Most accepted that the failure to achieve an agreed amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between Washington and Moscow led to the scrapping of that Treaty. But the pathetic under-achievement of the 'Thirteen Steps,' accompanied by statements of several nuclear-weapon States that they did not feel bound by these agreed measures came as a shock and led to great frustration among the majority of NPT members. If we start from the notion of the 'bargain' and accept that nuclear disarmament will not happen overnight, nuclear-weapon States could assume a different posture. A quick look at the 'Thirteen Steps' shows that they are largely compatible with such a posture. Nowadays, nuclear-weapon States do not face existential threats against which unfettered options for keeping or acquiring large arsenals or revolutionary new weapons would appear necessary. If there is any concern that nuclear activities in North Korea or Iran may lead to the emergence of new nuclear powers, the world's existing arsenals are more than enough to control that risk. Just as clearly, there is no need for these options in humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions. To the contrary, considering the employment of nuclear weapons in such contingencies would contradict the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The Court said that, if at all, the use of nuclear weapons was only justifiable if national survival were at stake. Neither are nuclear weapons needed for keeping a hostile leadership at bay or eliminating it. Even if nuclear deterrence were seen as a needed option, sharply reduced arsenals would still suffice to do the job. And against the scourge of our time, trans national terrorism, nuclear weapons have no use at all. What, then, is holding up nuclear disarmament? In my view, residual distrust is one problem. It persuades some nuclear-weapon States to keep the option for larger arsenals open if ballistic missile defences are introduced. Beyond this specific strategic concern, it appears that keeping freedom of action as such is valued highly by some - so highly that even legal and political undertakings are pushed aside. Fears that disarmament could lead uncontrollably to the untimely elimination of all nuclear weapons run strong. Even the completely reasonable and beneficial measures agreed in 2000 appear as such a big risk that nuclear-weapon States are not willing to take the first step. And of course, the members of the nuclear weapon complexes are happy to supply new notions of threats to which nuclear answers such as 'bunker busters' or 'mini-nukes' that have been on their wish-list for decades - with shifting targets, to be sure are then warmly recommended. The United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters has tried to identify the priorities in the field of nuclear disarmament. A report to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his High-Level Panel sets priorities with the objective of preventing nuclear terrorism. It recommended further reduction and eventual elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons; the prompt start of negotiations for a verifiable treaty to provide for the cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; and a convention for the ban of radiological weapons and warfare. In connection with the thirteen steps, this list of priorities provides a good program of action that could be tackled immediately. Such an initiative could restore some of the confidence lost by the international community in the validity of the disarmament undertakings of nuclear-weapon States. Without such a move forward, recriminations within the NPT family may mount - weakening the determination to confront the double risks of more nuclear proliferation and terrorist access to the most horrible weapons of our time