Protection of nuclear facilities against outer aggressions
Creators
- 1. Ministere de l'Industrie et de la Recherche, 75 - Paris (France). Service Central de Surete des Installations Nucleaires
Description
The various types of outer aggressions envisaged in safety analysis for nuclear facilities are reviewed. These outer aggressions are classified as natural and non-natural phenomena, the latter depending on the human activities in the vicinity of nuclear sites. The principal natural phenomena able to constitute aggressions are atmospheric phenomena (strong winds, snow storms, hail, frosting mists), hydrologie phenomena such as tides, surges, flood, low waters, and geologic phenomena such as earthquakes. Artificial phenomena are concerned with aircraft crashes, projectiles, fire, possible ruptures of dams, and intentional human aggressions. The protection against intentional human aggressions is of two sorts: first, the possibility of access to the installations mostly sensitive to sabotage are to be prevented or reduced, secondly redundant circuits and functions must be separated for preventing their simultaneous destruction in the case when sabotage actors have reach the core of the facility
Abstract (French)
On passe en revue les differents types d'agressions exterieures qui sont envisages dans les analyses de surete des installations nucleaires. Ces agressions exterieures sont classees en phenomenes naturels et non naturels, ces derniers etant lies aux activites humaines a proximite des sites nucleaires. Les principaux phenomenes naturels pouvant constituer des agressions, sont les phenomenes atmospheriques (vents violents, tempetes de neige, grele, brouillards givrants), hydrologiques tels que marees, houles, inondations, etiages et geologiques tels que les tremblements de terre. Les phenomenes non naturels concernent les chutes d'avions, les projectiles, les incendies, les ruptures possibles de barrages et les agressions humaines de caractere intentionnel. La protection contre les agressions humaines volontaires se place a deux niveaux: au premier chef, il est necessaire d'empecher ou de limiter les possibilites d'acces des saboteurs aux installations les plus sensibles, en second lieu, il convient de se placer dans l'hypothese ou les saboteurs ont pu parvenir jusqu'au coeur de l'installation et de separer les fonctions et circuits de securite redondants, afin d'empecher leur destruction simultaneeAdditional details
Additional titles
- Original title (French)
- La protection des installations nucleaires contre les agressions exterieures
Publishing Information
- Journal Title
- Rev. Ing.
- Journal Issue
- no.245
- Series
- Rev. Ing.
INIS
- Country of Publication
- France
- Country of Input or Organization
- France
- INIS RN
- 8303933
- Subject category
- S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; S61: RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY;
- Descriptors DEI
- ACCIDENTS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; PHYSICAL PROTECTION DEVICES; REACTOR SAFETY; RISK ANALYSIS; SABOTAGE; SAFETY