Bilateral agreements and the evolution of the international safeguards system

Some nuclear exporting countries consider that an importing nation's general adherence to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is not a sufficient condition for allowing trade in material or equipment to proceed. For trade to be possible, these exporters first require the conclusion of bilateral agreements. The purpose of this paper is to offer some industry views on how such agreements can be made to contribute better to their objectives without hampering international trade in nuclear materials. As with the earlier papers the Institute has published concerning international trade in uranium, members hope that their views, springing as they do from day-to-day experience within the nuclear industry, will be found useful as an input to discussions now being undertaken by governments. Section headings: brief history of non-proliferation policy; Non-proliferation Treaty; breakdown of non-proliferation consensus; return to bilaterals; main objectives of existing bilaterals; possible solutions to difficulties; general principles for tracking; the role of the IAEA; safeguarding of U3O8; plutonium storage; plutonium use; conclusion. (author)