Methodology for evaluating port vulnerability to nuclear smuggling

Full text: Background: Fueled by an increase in intercepted nuclear smuggling events, the threat of nuclear smuggling has received increased attention in recent years. This attention has resulted in a focused effort to improve the ability to deter or detect smuggling attempts through border crossings, including seaports, airports, and rail and road crossings. These efforts have primarily been focused on installing SNM detectors across vehicle and pedestrian gates entering these ports. However, the effectiveness of this application in deterring or detecting events has not been carefully evaluated. A recent effort was undertaken to evaluate in detail the susceptibility of an international seaport and airport to nuclear smuggling. The evaluation considered a range of adversary profiles to match these against existing and proposed port security measures and equipment. The evaluation was pursued using path analysis methodologies, which were adapted to the port environment. As a result of limited data concerning the effectiveness of patrol, search, and access control procedures at the port, an assessment methodology was developed to estimate these in a standardized fashion. The methodology considers a detailed list of tasks each type of adversary must successfully accomplish for any particular smuggling scenario and path through the port. Within these tasks, locations or times of potential detection are identified. From a look-up table, a detection level (Low, Medium, or High) is assigned to each detection potential based upon the type of detection possible and considering the possible access or authority of each adversary. The overall detection potential in determined as a sum of these individual detection potentials according to the equation: Pt={1-Σ(1-Pn). Where: Pt is the total detection potential for an adversary path, and Pn is the individual detection at a particular location or time. The evaluation revealed that the current process of installing portals at perimeter gates ignores several plausible adversary scenarios, and that these scenarios can be addressed through a combination of procedures, minor physical security upgrades and relocation of portals. The presentation will discuss the adversary profiles used for the analysis, will detail the analysis methodology and discuss the results of the analysis. (author)