The second line of defence in the Russian Federation

One of the most dangerous forms of terrorism is nuclear and radiological terrorism, including threats by terrorists to use so called dirty bombs. The Russian Federation?s national security concept recognizes the possibility of a terrorist threat arising in practically any sphere of State activity. The threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism is considered an integral part in the overall problem of ensuring national security. Without doubt, reliable physical protection of nuclear material and a reliable system of accounting for and control of nuclear material and radioactive substances play a key role in preventing and countering possible acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Clearly, however, the problem of combating the manifestations of nuclear and radiological terrorism cannot be solved by physical protection measures alone. Considering that the whole threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism is conditional upon the possibility of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances and their illegal possession or transport in a State?s territory, across its customs boundaries or in transit across its territory, national systems for responding to the threat of terrorism must be designed as an informational and logical whole integrated with the system for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances. Generally speaking, the term ?second line of defence? refers to the set of measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances at the next level above the nuclear facility. This level can be the territory of a country or its border. The ?second line of defence and countermeasures against nuclear and radiological terrorism? means coordinated actions taken by federal bodies of the executive power whose functional duties include the prevention of terrorist acts in general, and by law enforcement bodies, ministries, departments and organizations directly concerned with the use of radioactive material and substances or providing security during their storage and use. The system must have a central competent body for taking prompt decisions in assessing thedegree of potential threat and adopting preventive measures. This then makes it possible to coordinate the work of these systems at the international level. The State system for countering nuclear and radiological terrorism must be based on the national system for countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances. These must be combated jointly, using all cost effective means and methods. Work is being done at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) on establishing a conceptual profile and basic technical systems solutions for the creation of a State system for preventing and countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances. The informational and logical unity of the structure of data generated and used in solving the problems of physical protection, accounting for and control of nuclear material, and countermeasures against nuclear and radiological terrorism is to be preserved. During this work the main forms of activity and interaction of the federal bodies of the executive power, ministries, departments and organizations are being determined