Published September 2011 | Version v1
Miscellaneous

Specification for trip settings for a glovebox fissile material leak detection system

  • 1. Babcock International Group Sellafield, Seascale, Cumbria, CA20 1PG (United Kingdom)
  • 2. Sellafield Ltd. Sellafield, Seascale, Cumbria, CA20 1PG (United Kingdom)

Description

Following an event where plutonium oxide/oxalate powder accumulated in a glovebox at Sellafield, the facility safety case was reviewed. One recommendation from this review was that a neutron monitoring system aimed at detecting any similar future accumulations should be installed. This system has now been installed and is functioning. One area of interest with respect to the system was the methodology used to determine the appropriate neutron count-rate settings used to trip the plant. Clearly the system must function before accumulations reach the critical condition (with an appropriate safety margin). However it is not a simple matter of calculating the minimum safe mass and setting up the neutron monitor to detect this mass. The situation is complicated by: -) The need to consider the potential locations in the glovebox for accumulation of leaked fissile material. -) The possible location sites for detectors (outside the gloveboxes). -) The variation in potential fissile material forming the accumulation (chemical form, density, moisture content, shape, etc.). -) Background effects (including those brought about by variation in the normal glovebox inventory) and the need to avoid spurious trips. Hence, rather than minimum safe mass, the parameter of interest is the minimum safe mass in the form and position which is most difficult to detect. In this paper, the method by which these complications were overcome is given for one glovebox, selected as being a relatively complex example. Essentially this was done by: 1) Determining a range of safe masses as a function of fissile material variations using MONK. 2) Modeling detector performance in the presence of these unsafe conditions using MCNP. This included considering variations in normal inventory. 3) Validation of the MCNP modeling using a plutonium standard. 4) Selecting trip settings which ensured that the trip would operate before an unsafe accumulation would arise, but where there was sufficient margin over normal operations count rates. (authors)

Part of:
Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety - ICNC 2011

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety - ICNC 2011
Imprint Pagination
1726 p.
Journal Page Range
12 p.

Conference

Title
9. International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety
Acronym
ICNC 2011
Dates
19-22 Sep 2011
Place
Edinburgh (United Kingdom)

INIS

Country of Publication
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA)
Country of Input or Organization
France
INIS RN
53051860
Subject category
S11: NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; S46: INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; S42: ENGINEERING;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference, Non-conventional Literature
Descriptors DEI
COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION; CRITICALITY; ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS; GLOVEBOXES; HE-3 COUNTERS; M CODES; PLUTONIUM; SPECIFICATIONS
Descriptors DEC
ACTINIDES; COMPUTER CODES; ELEMENTS; EQUIPMENT; LABORATORY EQUIPMENT; MEASURING INSTRUMENTS; METALS; NEUTRON DETECTORS; PROPORTIONAL COUNTERS; RADIATION DETECTORS; SIMULATION; TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS

Optional Information

Notes
3 refs.
Secondary number(s)
INIS-XN--22-ICNC-2011-2-13