Russian approach to nuclear reactor safety

Soviet reactor and power-station design initially proceeded from a safety philosophy that did not acknowledge a loss-of-coolant accident caused by a double-ended pipe break nor a massive core meltdown as credible eventualities to be considered in the design of systems and details. Generally, engineered safeguards and conservatism in design have been regarded as adequate insurance against accidents that could escalate to a point where there is significant radiation damage to either plant personnel or the public. Recently, there has been some change in the attitude of scientists toward secondary containment in pressurized-water-reactor plants. In pressure-tube boiling-water reactors and liquid-metal-cooled fast breeder reactors, Soviet experience on several demonstration and ''semicommercial'' units has been interpreted to mean that core damage propagation and accidents involving large energy releases are not credible. It appears, however, that there is not complete unanimity on all safety questions and greater dispersion of authority and more formal safety reviews seem to be in the making