The fissile material cutoff treaty: what is it and why should we care?

A leading nuclear arms control and nonproliferation priority is the achievement of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT would place a verifiable cap on the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons worldwide, complementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's qualitative constraint on the further development of global nuclear arsenals. An FMCT's advantages notwithstanding, progress towards a treaty has been blocked by the desire of some to tie it to broader nuclear disarmament goals. This paper argues that an FMCT, by banning the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, supports those goals. The paper will also explore the scope and verification arrangements for such a treaty. Regarding the latter, it is suggested that a focussed, rather than comprehensive, approach to verification would be preferable for reasons of cost, efficiency, and negotiability. Finally, the paper will examine the possible affect of an FMCT on civilian nuclear industry, concluding that the impacts are likely to be quite small