Published 2001 | Version v1
Report Open

Tripartite enrichment project: Safeguards at enrichment plants equipped with Russian centrifuges

  • 1. Ministry of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, Moscow (Russian Federation)
  • 2. International Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Safeguards, Vienna (Austria)
  • 3. China Atomic Energy Authority, Beijing (China)

Description

Full text: This paper describes the work undertaken in the Tripartite Enrichment Project carried out under an Agreement between the IAEA and the Department of External Relations of the Ministry of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, Minatom, and under a Contract between the IAEA and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA). In 1993, the Government of the People's Republic of China informed the Agency that China had decided on a voluntary basis to add the Shaanxi Uranium Enrichment Plant to the list of eligible facilities under the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/369). The Plant was under construction at the time. After consultations, the Agency selected the Shaanxi Plant in September of 1997 for the implementation of safeguards. The Agency realized that the safeguards approach used at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities in other States would not be fully applicable. Chief among the reasons for this conclusion were the observations that enrichment plants incorporating Russian gas centrifuges are designed for a much greater degree of operational flexibility than other plants, and that travel conditions to the Shaanxi Plant at least at present are not compatible with requirements for unannounced access at the facility for the performance of unannounced inspections in the cascade area. The Tripartite Enrichment Project was conceived as a means to develop a safeguards approach for any plant equipped with Russian centrifuge technology. The Project was created through a cooperative arrangement involving specialists from Minatom, CAEA and the IAEA. It comprised seven tasks, the salient products of which are summarized in the following paragraphs. Each of the tasks has associated with it a Task Report. As the work proceeded, progress meetings were held in Vienna, Beijing and Moscow, and critical discussions were held at the Angarsk Enrichment Plant in the Russian Federation and at the Shaanxi Enrichment Plant in the People's Republic of China. (author)

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Part of:
Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses
Imprint Pagination
377 p.
Journal Page Range
p. 132
Report number
IAEA-SM--367

Conference

Title
Verification and nuclear material security
Acronym
Symposium on international safeguards
Dates
29 Oct - 2 Nov 2001
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
33006957
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS; CHINESE ORGANIZATIONS; IAEA AGREEMENTS; INSPECTION; ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; SAFEGUARD REGULATIONS; SAFEGUARDS
Descriptors DEC
AGREEMENTS; EASTERN EUROPE; EUROPE; INDUSTRIAL PLANTS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS; ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS; LAWS; NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; REGULATIONS

Optional Information

Secondary number(s)
IAEA-SM--367/8/02