The IAEA and the future of nuclear power - A view from industry

The terrorist attacks of 11 September have provided a 'wake up call to everyone'. The problem, however, with governments and large bureaucracies is that they often tend to the harsh realities of the outside world. The IAEA, like the United Nations, does not have this luxury, and has been responding to new challenges virtually throughout its existence. Its most solemn responsibility is to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear material at over a thousand installations worldwide, facilities containing over 111,000 'significant quantities' of safeguarded material. The theft or diversion of even a fraction of one percent of this material could prove to be utterly catastrophic not only for the Agency and its safeguards system, but also for the future of humankind. The IAEA now has the opportunity to re-examine the adequacy of safeguards and physical security controls without the prior occurrence of a nuclear detonation, a new attack on a nuclear facility, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear material by a terrorist group, or the use of a radiological weapon. It must also re-examine closely its own past assumptions about the likely motivations of terrorists and their willingness and capabilities to 'do the unthinkable'. In rising to this challenge, the IAEA must work proactively - it must have the vision of knowing where to go, the wisdom to understand the importance of getting there, and the knowledge of how to navigate the treacherous terrain that lies ahead. I have every confidence that the IAEA has the leadership and professional expertise to rise to this challenge. Fortunately, many of the tools needed to achieve these goals are found in a unique international legal instrument, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)