Published February 1995 | Version v1
Report Open

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

Description

An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications. (orig./GL)

Availability note (English)

MF available from INIS under the Report Number.

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Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Pagination
51 p.
Report number
ECN-RX--95-005

Conference

Title
Clingendael nuclear non-proliferation workshop.
Dates
8-10 Sep 1994.
Place
(Netherlands).

INIS

Country of Publication
Netherlands
Country of Input or Organization
Netherlands
INIS RN
27032656
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
IAEA SAFEGUARDS; INSPECTION; NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY; NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PHYSICAL PROTECTION; POLITICAL ASPECTS; PROLIFERATION; VERIFICATION
Descriptors DEC
SAFEGUARDS; TREATIES