When renewable portfolio standards meet cap-and-trade regulations in the electricity sector: Market interactions, profits implications, and policy redundancy

Emission trading programs (C and T) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are two common tools used by policymakers to control GHG emissions in the energy and other energy-intensive sectors. Little is known, however, as to the policy implications resulting from these concurrent regulations, especially given that their underlying policy goals and regulatory schemes are distinct. This paper applies both an analytical model and a computational model to examine the short-run implications of market interactions and policy redundancy. The analytical model is used to generate contestable hypotheses, while the numerical model is applied to consider more realistic market conditions. We have two central findings. First, lowering the CO2 C and T cap might penalize renewable units, and increasing the RPS level could sometimes benefit coal and oil and make natural gas units worse off. Second, making one policy more stringent would weaken the market incentive, which the other policy relies upon to attain its intended policy target. - Highlights: → Lowering the CO2 C and T cap might penalize renewable units, and increasing the RPS level could sometimes benefit coal and oil and make natural gas units worse off. → Making one policy more stringent would weaken the market incentive, which the other policy relies upon to attain its intended policy target. → The market-wise average emissions could increase when increasing RPS requirement.