IAEA Safeguards in Pakistan and Emerging Issues/Challenges

Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in Pakistan dates back to March, 1962 when a trilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/34) was signed for the supply of Pakistan Research Reactor-1 (PARR-1). Since then Pakistan has concluded several safeguards agreements with the Agency. All the safeguards agreements concluded by Pakistan are governed under the Safeguards Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, which is a model for countries not party to NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). As per this model the item-specific safeguards are applied to Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Being a 66-type country, some times, very peculiar nature of safeguards issues arise that are not common in the States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and which pose challenges for both the IAEA and the country. In Pakistan, not only nuclear material, but non-nuclear material is also subjected to safeguards under the respective Safeguards Agreement. At KANUPP, for example, the heavy water used as moderator and coolant, is under IAEA safeguards. The Suspension and Termination options of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 are atypical from comprehensive safeguards and are utilized in Pakistan to resolve various issues. For example, the HEU plates are targeted in a safeguarded research reactor (PARR-1) for Mo-99 production, which are then separated in an unsafeguarded Moly Production Plant employing the suspension clause of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. The Additional Protocol substantially enlarges the IAEA's ability to check for clandestine nuclear activities and facilities. The requirements of the Model Additional Protocol are basically designed for the non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT; the nuclear weapon states are, however, free to choose among or limit the application of the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol. The INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 countries (countries not party to the NPT) may analyse the impact to their programme, of adhering to the Additional Protocol. However, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 countries, just like the nuclear weapon states, are also free to choose among the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol. (author)