Case study: Findings and lessons learned from investigating a uranium intake and the corresponding dose calculations

Full text: Purpose: To discuss the findings of an investigation into uranium intake and to discuss the lessons learned from the subsequent bioassay monitoring and dose calculations. Method: An investigation was held to determine direct and root causes after elevated air concentration levels were reported during the execution of an ad-hoc task. A programme of bioassay monitoring (urine sampling and lung counts) was implemented for the involved staff and committed effective doses were calculated. Major findings of the investigation: a) Inadequate pre-task assessment led to hazards not being identified and subsequently proper control measures were not implemented; b) Inadequate localised control of contamination led to contamination of worker's clothes and faces and contamination of rest of area; c) Workers were complacent which led to a lapse in safety awareness and subsequently they removed their face masks during the task. Problems experienced with bioassay monitoring and dose calculations: a) Some bioassay samples were not taken or were given incorrectly; b) Calculating doses were difficult due to lack of information regarding date of intake; whether there were other possible intakes; and the physiochemical nature of the uranium; c) Weak correlation between predicted and actual bioassay data; d) Period between starting bioassay monitoring and the actual event was too long. Conclusions: a) Shortcomings in the control of contamination with protective clothing and during the execution of ad-hoc tasks; b) Identifying hazards and assessing it is extremely dependant on the skill and capabilities if the Radiation Protection Officers; c) Instructions to workers regarding sampling of urine and arrangements around the sampling should be very specific with only one person responsible for managing the process; d) Be aware of the psychological impact on the affected workers; e) 2 nd Independent dose calculation important for verifying doses; f) Detection capabilities and bioassay methods not adequate for monitoring intake of S-type uranium. (author)