Integrated safeguards: How much flexibility is possible, and acceptable?

Full text: The advent of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) introduces amongst other things an opportunity for the IAEA to exercise greater flexibility in the planning and conduct of safeguards inspections and other verification activities. Performing the full range of both classical safeguards measures and safeguards strengthening measures would result in substantial redundancy - the realisation of this has prompted the development of integrated safeguards. The basic principles which govern the development of integrated safeguards include that they should be non-discriminatory, i.e. the same technical objectives should be pursued in all States with comparable safeguards obligations - recognising though that the measures actually used in individual States may differ - and they should be based on State-wide considerations, i.e. that all the elements of integrated safeguards need to be meshed together in a coherent whole taking into account the individual State's nuclear fuel cycle and other relevant State-specific factors. Safeguards strengthening measures such as environmental sampling, unpredictability of inspections, enhanced information analysis and complementary access are difficult to place within the uniform approach hitherto adopted for the implementation of classical safeguards. Application of these measures involves a substantial degree of qualitative judgment and flexibility, taking account of the overall information available to the Agency about each State's fuel cycle. It is the authors' view that the implementation of integrated safeguards should incorporate substantial elements of expert judgment and flexibility. The Additional Protocol itself emphasises that implementation of safeguards strengthening measures should not to be systematic and mechanistic, but rather 'selective'. Judgment and flexibility should also be important in rationalising the implementation of routine safeguards in the integrated safeguards context. A 'checklist' approach is against the intent of integrated safeguards as most Member States understand it. The introduction of integrated safeguards provides the opportunity to develop a better way of applying safeguards. In considering the degree of flexibility that might be incorporated in the implementation of integrated safeguards, key questions include: How much flexibility are Member States prepared to allow the Agency? How far is flexibility consistent with confidence, credibility and impartiality? How much flexibility is the Secretariat prepared to apply? Is there a preference for uniformity? Arguments in favor of uniformity include considerations such as: the maintenance of standardisation and quality assurance processes across the Agency's different Operations Divisions; the problems of training and making effective use of an inspectorate consisting of staff members with a wide variety of backgrounds (both technical and cultural) and differing levels of practical safeguards experience; protection of the Agency and individual staff members from possible accusations of discrimination in the approach to particular Member States. A preference for uniformity appears to underlie current formulae in the complementary access guidelines, and the ongoing exercise to develop criteria for integrated safeguards. If this is the case, there is a need to establish whether this preference is soundly based or simply reflects established practice. Clearly an approach based on flexibility and expert judgment presents substantial challenges: how to ensure an appropriate standard of implementation? how to ensure outcomes are effective and conclusions credible? Resolving these challenges will be demanding, and the Secretariat will require Member State support. The sooner these issues are addressed, however, the sooner the full potential of integrated safeguards can be realized. (author)