Strengthening international forms for physical protection of nuclear material

No country is immune to nuclear terrorism. Recent experiences with terrorist bombings at the New York World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City Federal Building have indicated the fact that some terrorists are intent on killing as many people as possible and would not hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction to do so. Japan's Aum Shinri-kyo sect tried to buy a nuclear weapon, experimented with the biological weapon anthrax, and used the chemical weapon nerve gas against passengers on the Tokyo subway. Weapons usable nuclear material is now for sale by smugglers. The NPT regime and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are inadequate to deal with the threat that terrorists might buy or steal such material to make a bomb. The Convention only applies to nuclear material 'for peaceful purposes in international transport' and fails to provide for any inspections. The IAEA and its Member States should review physical protection standards in the Convention and in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. Peer reviews - a substitute for inspections - should be more widespread. States unwilling to accept peer reviews should be asked to respond to an IAEA questionnaire on their physical protection practices. Some method should be found to conduct inspections of physical protection practices in States with significant weapons usable material, particularly Russia and the United States of America. After a period of expert review and experimentation, the Convention should be amended to remove its exceptions from coverage, to strengthen its standards and to require inspections. (author)