An evaluation of containment inerting and air dilution systems as methods for post-accident hydrogen control in BWRS

Hydrogen control is important in post-accident situations because of possibilities for containment rupture due to hydrogen deflagration or detonation. Post-accident hydrogen generation in BWR containments is analyzed as a function of engineered hydrogen control system, assumed either nitrogen inerting or air dilution. Fault tree analysis was applied to assess the failure probability per demand of each system. These failure rates were then combined with the probability of accidents producing various hydrogen generation rates to calculate the overall system hydrogen control probability. Results indicate that both systems render approximately the same overall hydrogen control failure rate (air dilution: 8.3 x 10-2; nitrogen inerting: 1.3 x 10-2-2 x 10-3). Drywell entries and unscheduled shutdowns were also analyzed to determine the impact on the total BWR accident risk as it relates to the decay heat removal system. Results indicate that inerting may increase the overall risk due to a possible increase in the number of unscheduled shutdowns due to a lessened operator ability to correct and identify unidentified leakage from the primary coolant system. Further, possible benefits of inerting due to reduced torus corrosion and fire risk in containment appear to be dominated by the possible operation-related disadvantages. (orig.)