Published January 1, 2004 | Version v1
Journal article

The Implications of a New ERa in Arms Control -- Perspectives and Analysis

Description

On November 13, 2003 the INMM hosted a workshop in Washington, DC entitled 'The Implications of a New Era in Arms Control on Regional Nonproliferation and Nuclear Materials Management'. In this paper we summarize the workshop's highlights and provide our analysis of the dominant themes. Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), delivered the keynote address and focused on four points that are key to understanding the new era: (1) The demise of traditional East/West arms control; (2) The new strategic relationship between Russia and the United States; (3) The blurring of the distinction between nonproliferation and counter-terrorism; (4) The growing recognition that the nonproliferation regime is no longer adequate and needs to be strengthened. He issued a set of challenges to the workshop participants: if his premises were right, what should replace the lexicon of arms control? He described a four-part strategy for nuclear materials protection in Russia, and asked if that model should be replicated globally - potentially by leveraging the new relationship with Russia. Should it be through the IAEA, bilaterally, or some other mechanism? Asserting that the old Nonproliferation Treaty regime was inadequate, he asked what should replace it, and how do we bring it about? Three panel discussions were presented: (1) Implications of a New Era in US/Russia Arms Control Agreements; (2) Implications of a New in Arms Control Upon Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation: South Asia/East Asia/Middle East; and (3) Nuclear Materials Management in a New Era of Arms Control In the first panel, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association argued that arms control agreements provided predictability in the reduction of arms, and had been successful in advancing the methods of verification. Lucas Fischer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control at the US State Department acknowledged that INF and START provide a basis for verification and transparency. He defended the Treaty of Moscow, arguing that a related US-Russian joint declaration established working groups to focus on introducing transparency in offensive weapons and missile defense

Additional details

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Journal of Nuclear Materials
Journal Volume
32
Journal Issue
2
Journal Page Range
p. 18-20
ISSN
0022-3115

INIS

Country of Publication
Netherlands
Country of Input or Organization
United States
INIS RN
40050906
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Descriptors DEI
ARMS CONTROL; IAEA; MANAGEMENT; MISSILES; NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; PROLIFERATION; SECURITY; VERIFICATION; WEAPONS
Descriptors DEC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; MANAGEMENT; TREATIES

Optional Information

Contract/Grant/Project number
AC05-76RL01830
Funding organization
US Department of Energy (United States)
Secondary number(s)
PNNL-SA--40205