Comments upon human exposure to depleted uranium during and after the Gulf and Balkans conflicts

The Royal Society report contains a number of comments and suggestions which are questionable or are not acceptable. Because of the total failure to obtain minimal environmental and clinical data at the time of the conflicts, retrospective, abstract epidemiological studies are unlikely to be of any value, indeed the confounding issues are so numerous that any success cannot be expected. Some individuals during the Gulf conflict seem to have been exposed to a cocktail of drugs and possibly other biological agents for which information is sparse with respect to amounts, routes of exposure and acute versus chronic symptoms. Spratt does not examine the matter of 'hot particles' in sufficient depth; for purposes of the report it is irrelevant whether or not hot particles are of any particular concern, simply that they have been poorly studied and data are lacking upon which a judgement can be made. Hamilton presented a rare description for the in situ distribution of uranium in human bone for chronic nonoccupationally exposed individuals. The uranium exhibited a distribution which reflected uptake of uranium on endosteal surfaces, especially of trabecular bone. The general labelling of bone apatite was not observed, hence the chronic diffusion of uranium deposited on endosteal surfaces does not appear to penetrate the inorganic bone tissues. For labelled Haversian systems in long bone, the physical geometry of deposition as viewed by autoradiographic techniques has an appearance of hot particle configurations. Recent discoveries that stem cells are associated with such surfaces raise the question of their susceptibility to both inorganic uranium and any associated ionisation radiation which is related to point source depositions The actual cell or cell surfaces where the uranium is taken up are unknown. The same situation in principle applies to thoracic lymph nodes, albeit their susceptibility and biological purpose renders them of less concern. The comment that it is difficult to measure DU, total amount and isotopic composition, with respect to DU munition debris is totally unacceptable. Indeed, in commenting upon the Royal Society's reports I restrict myself to data and information for which I was directly associated, but acknowledge the considerable amount of work undertaken by others. The Royal Society working group should note that the whole basis for the use of uranium in the nuclear fuel cycle and in weaponry is based upon an ability to accurately measure very small concentrations and differences in isotopic compositions. The literature is replete with examples of the quality of measurements. In the UK the British Nuclear Fuels plant at Sellafield (previously Windscale) has discharged considerable amounts of DU, mainly processed, but together with significant amounts of unprocessed material, into the Cumbrian environment of the UK. For decades DU in diffuse and hot particle form was easily measured in sediments and biota of Cumbria and the adjacent NE Irish Sea. If environmental DU data are required for use in Gulf and Balkans conflict the BNFL releases are of interest. However, it should be noted that beyond a statistical evaluation and excepting the few acute radiological accidents which have occurred at BNFL, Sellafield, the radiological exposure has not impaired the health of the population or workforce and uranium has never been identified as an element of concern. I do not know the reasons why adequate measures were not taken to ensure that good scientific evidence for later use was obtained at the onset of both conflicts. Repetitive reports which do not add any substance to what is already known do not seem to serve any purpose. It is possible that at the time of incidents, such as deployment of DU in the Gulf and the Balkans, there were political, military or policy restraints to normal practices. As a consequence the repeated publication and media coverage of these events decades after they took place can only serve to cause a lack of confidence by the general public, a belief that a cover-up took place. The cost of such exercises cannot be supported, but more important through their publicity the general public concludes that science cannot provide answers and scientists are not competent. In the instance of the Gulf conflict, which is associated with a detrainment to health of soldiers, other diverse and more plausible causes such as use of cocktails of drugs seem more likely and warrant detailed consideration; precise information concerning type, frequency and duration of such exposures or comprehensive epidemiological surveys do not seem to be forthcoming in order that reliable risk assessments can be made