Reframing of nuclear safety logic on the basis of resilience engineering

Public discussion on the future of nuclear energy depends crucially on how nuclear safety is established in the wake of the Fukushima Accident and how it is explained to the public. This issue cannot be addressed by simply explaining the technical measures that need to be introduced to enhance safety. How could an accident be whitewashed by simply dismissing it as an unexpected event? Why did the concerned parties fail to immediately take heed of the warnings given before the Fukushima Accident about the likelihood of tsunamis and station blackouts? The public rejection of nuclear power will remain unchanged unless such questions are properly addressed. This commentary explains that the logical backing provided by safety based on defense in depth as applied in the nuclear sector, which had been considered inherently adequate, has been undermined due to changes to the intended targets over time and efforts to adapt to changes involving the incorporation of new findings. In future discussions of nuclear safety logic, it is vital that the nuclear industry adapt to these changes effectively. This commentary also describes the significance of resilience engineering as a guiding methodology for dealing with the relevant changes. (author)