Published May 2019 | Version v1
Book

Safety culture and beliefs in the nuclear industry — Looking forward: Looking back. Opening keynote address

Creators

  • 1. Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster (United Kingdom)

Description

Over the last three decades, the nuclear industry has come to accept both the concept of safety culture and the possible role that it might play in the aetiology of accidents and incidents and in safety management. This development is to be welcomed in general terms but is not without its shortcomings in practice. These largely concern the definition and subsequent operationalization of the concept and the way in which it has then been put to use. While many would agree that safety culture is an emergent property of a complex organizational system and is multifaceted, in the nuclear industry, its measurement and management have often been focused on self-reported beliefs, perceptions and behaviours. Interventions often target changes in these psychological (individual) outcomes at the expense of the other aspects of safety culture. Furthermore, many of the models that underpin this approach have assumed universality: one size fits all. While such models are useful in population level research, they can be seriously inadequate and even misleading in more particular situations. They are not sufficiently context specific at the plant level or in functions within plants. Unsurprisingly, therefore, improvements in safety culture, so modelled and measured, do not always strongly relate to improvements in safety management and safety performance. The paper explores the changes that might be necessary for a fair test of the utility of safety culture in determining the quality of safety management and actual safety performance. The final point raised in the paper is fundamental but missed by some. However cast, measured and managed, the concept of safety culture was never promoted as the sole determinant of safety management or the sole reason for safety failure. Therefore, judging the utility of the concept in relation to the quality of safety management in the nuclear industry can only be done logically in the context of the other factors involved. (author)

Part of:
Human and Organizational Aspects of Assuring Nuclear Safety — Exploring 30 Years of Safety Culture. Proceedings of an International Conference

Additional details

Publishing Information

Publisher
IAEA
Imprint Place
Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))
ISBN
978-92-0-103918-7
Imprint Title
Human and Organizational Aspects of Assuring Nuclear Safety #Em Dash# Exploring 30 Years of Safety Culture. Proceedings of an International Conference
Imprint Pagination
[1 CD-ROM]
Series
Proceedings Series
Journal Page Range
p. 17-29
ISSN
0074-1884

Conference

Title
International Conference on Human and Organizational Aspects of Assuring Nuclear Safety #Em Dash# Exploring 30 Years of Safety Culture
Dates
22-26 Feb 2016
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
50078369
Subject category
S22: GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
ACCIDENTS; FAILURES; MANAGEMENT; NUCLEAR INDUSTRY; PERFORMANCE; SAFETY; SAFETY CULTURE
Descriptors DEC
ATTITUDES; INDUSTRY

Optional Information

Notes
37 refs. Imprint:CD-ROM attached to the printed STI/PUB/1810 containing the papers presented at the parallel sessions and dialogue sessions of the conference
Secondary number(s)
STI/PUB--1810; IAEA-CN--237