Investment in the electric power network: An efficient mean to struggle against the market power of producers? - Paper N. 09.04.83
Description
The objective of this article is to analyse the consequences of an investment in the electric power network when a producer takes advantage of his position to adopt a strategic behaviour. The author first shows that the network manager may be induced to invest in the network, not to struggle against market power, but to maximise his congestion incomes. But the author also notices that this result is purely theoretical whereas, practically, these incomes do not pass to the network manager. Nevertheless, this result remains valid with investments opened to competition if remuneration depends of congestion incomes. Secondly, the author highlights a more fundamental aspect: a policy of investment in the network does not allow an opportunistic producer using a heterogeneous fleet of power plants to be disciplined. Therefore, it appears that an investment in the network allowing congestions to be eliminated without taking the reaction of a strategic producer into account, will not be the best answer whereas the transport capacity to be developed will be overestimated
Abstract (French)
Notre objectif est d'analyser les consequences d'un investissement dans le reseau lorsqu'un producteur profite de sa position pour adopter un comportement strategique. Notre etude relevera deux points importants. Le premier repose sur le fait que le Gestionnaire de Reseau de Transport (GRT) peut etre incite a investir dans le reseau, non pas pour lutter contre le pouvoir de marche, mais pour maximiser le montant des rentes de congestion qu'il lui revient. Relevons que ce resultat est theorique. Dans la pratique, les rentes ne reviennent pas au GRT. Neanmoins, ce resultat reste valable avec des investissements en transport ouverts a la concurrence si la remuneration de ces derniers depend des rentes de congestion. Le deuxieme, et finalement le plus fondamental, montrera qu'une politique d'investissement dans le reseau ne permet pas totalement de discipliner un producteur opportuniste utilisant un parc heterogene de centrales. Il ressortira de cette analyse que l'investissement dans le reseau permettant d'eliminer les congestions, sans tenir compte de la reaction du producteur strategique, ne sera pas la meilleure reponse puisque la capacite de transport a realiser sera surestimee. (auteur)Files
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Additional details
Additional titles
- Original title (French)
- Investissement dans le reseau electrique: Un moyen de lutte efficace Contre le pouvoir de marche des producteurs? - Cahier No. 09.04.83
Publishing Information
- Imprint Pagination
- 24 p.
- Report number
- INIS-FR--21-1509
INIS
- Country of Publication
- France
- Country of Input or Organization
- France
- INIS RN
- 53004683
- Subject category
- S24: POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION; S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
- Descriptors DEI
- COMPETITION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ECONOMIC IMPACT; ELECTRIC UTILITIES; HUMAN FACTORS; INVESTMENT; MARKET; POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS; POWER SYSTEMS
- Descriptors DEC
- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ECONOMICS; ENERGY SYSTEMS; PUBLIC UTILITIES
Optional Information
- Notes
- 7 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses