'Independence' in question. The construction of a relative autonomy for nuclear organizations facing up to politics in France

This article examines the evolution of organizations under public control within the nuclear sector in France, from the establishment of the first structures overseeing nuclear operations to the adoption of the Nuclear Transparency law that created a formal agency (1973-2006). Drawing on archival research from the Ministry of Environment, as well as interviews, it focuses particularly on organizational reforms - whether implemented or abandoned - that were developed in response to the Chernobyl accident in 1986. The article demonstrates the extent to which these projects are based on divergent governance models and describes the differing interpretations of the concept of 'independence' of the regulator, illustrating how various actors understand the role of politics in nuclear decisions. The initial 'technopolitical' model was characterized by strong executive control over nuclear decisions and, during the period studied, it gradually gave way to a new governance model in which political actors become more distant from regulatory roles and nuclear organizations, both operators and regulators, become more autonomous. The article explores the conditions that were necessary for this relative autonomy to emerge and addresses the impact on public actors' capacity to control nuclear facilities and the executive's ability to challenge established governance arrangements. (author)