Production of weapon's usable plutonium verification aspects

If the necessary distinction between categories of plutonium is made, and if the possibilities open by the 93+2 program are fully implemented, it should become possible to implement in the framework of the Cut-off Treaty, as well as in the framework of the NPT, a safeguards regime, fully non-discriminatory as far as the peaceful nuclear industries of NWS are concerned, with an amount of resources not significantly higher, if at all, than the one globally devoted at present to international safeguards. Such a regime could concentrate the inspection effort on really weapons-grade materials (be they separated or not), and the means to produce them, without neglecting non-weapons-grade materials such as reactor-grade plutonium or 19% uranium, but keeping the inspection effort at the level appropriate to the relatively lower risk they represent. But I am afraid all my paper is out of context of what is being actually discussed in this seminar. If I understood correctly, what many of us are after is to determine how we could make cheap safeguards for safeguarding the Cut-off, while keeping costly safeguards for the NPT. I am sorry, but personally I have no interest in discussing such an issue. If cheaper safeguards are less effective, I see no reason why we should apply them to India, Israel, and Pakistan. If they can be as effective, as I believe is the case thanks to the new Protocol, I see no reason why they should not be applied, as well, to NPT signatories