Optimizing the integrated safeguards system: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

The implementation of the new Integrated Safeguards System is a major responsibility for the IAEA and its Member States. Providing not only the capability to better control declared activities, but also to detect clandestine attempts, it is essential to improve the international nuclear weapons control regime and to increase the credibility of assurances given to the international community. Having the sole goal of establishing integrated safeguards in an optimal manner would in itself be a very challenging and demanding task. Unfortunately, the Secretariat is faced with other conflicting challenges: statutory obligations, additional programme requests from Member States and, not the least, the obligation to fit all its activities within a strict budgetary framework. Universal and early acceptance is necessary for the system to be fully effective and credible. It must however be recognised that wide and rapid adherence will be only achieved if the system is attractive enough and offers shared benefits, that is not only increased non-proliferation assurances, but also perspectives of optimisation and reduction of the inspection burden, not to forget the assurance of keeping costs under control. It is essential that the safeguards system be non-discriminatory and apply the same objectives and implementation principles to all States. Integrated Safeguards should only be applied in States which are in good standing with respect to their obligations under their safeguards Agreements and Protocols, and for which the Agency has reached positive conclusions after having applied all necessary verification measures and having performed a complete evaluation of the information available. Cost neutrality is obviously a primary constraint for Integrated Safeguards. Even if one has to recognise the additional costs and difficulties generated in the short term by the implementation of the new system, it is essential to be conscious that budgetary limits will be maintained, and to keep the objective of global cost neutrality in the long term. However, another principle that cannot be compromised is the fundamental objective of strengthening safeguards. In that perspective, the following points will be essential elements to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of Integrated Safeguards. The implementation of Integrated Safeguards should not be mechanistic, not only in order to comply with the Additional Protocol, but also because the systematic and uniform application of undifferentiated measures would not allow to achieve the significant improvements expected from the new system, nor to keep costs under control. On the contrary, implementation details should be adapted to the specificity of individual situations and to the Agency's evaluation of each State's situation. The Agency should in particular adjust its verification effort and choose, among the set of available measures, to apply those which are the most relevant to specific situations and provide maximum effectiveness. It should thus concentrate its efforts on situations where it cannot meet satisfactorily its objective of reaching conclusions and providing credible assurance. In addition to adjusting its verification activities to specific situations, the Agency should also update its criteria to account for the additional information available and the general evolution of the system. In particular, it should perform a broad review of material categorisation and timeliness factors to avoid maintaining previous specific technical goals if Integrated Safeguards make them obsolete. The will and capability of a State to achieve transparency on its nuclear activities contribute to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards and to the enhancement of the cost/effectiveness ratio of the Agency's activities. They make it easier for the Agency to reach its conclusions and improve their credibility. As such, transparency should be an important element for the Agency to take into account in its evaluation of the State. Ensuring that verification activities are partly unpredictable, with respect to timing, location, and activities performed, is a strong deterrent and can lead to cost savings while maintaining a high level of assurance. Some level of unpredictability should thus be introduced in all aspects of verification. Complementary access is an essential feature of the new Safeguards System. Although it should not be used in a mechanistic fashion nor as a systematic prerequisite for Integrated Safeguards, it should take place whenever necessary, not only to ensure the effectiveness of safeguards, but also to maintain the possibility to have recourse to it. Needless to say, the Agency should also, in a pragmatic way, seize every technical opportunity to reduce costs, for instance through the use of advanced technology where it can provide savings, or through increased co-operation with Regional or State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material and controlled use of the results of their work. In conclusion, it should be tirelessly reiterated that the ultimate goal of the new system is stronger safeguards and increased assurances for the international community. And this will only be possible, especially in a context of financial constraints, through a pragmatic, goal- oriented, fresh and determined approach to the new rules that will make Integrated Safeguards effective, cost-effective and, in the end, viable