Applying programme 93+2 in the United States of America

In 1996, in order to promote the conclusion of a Protocol strengthening the ability of the IAEA to implement comprehensive safeguards agreements, President Clinton pledged that 'the U.S. will apply the new measures as fully as possible consistent with its obligations under the NPT.' This paper will address the issues that led up to this statement, including early U.S. responses to the question of which Programme 93+2 measures the nuclear weapons states should adopt. The paper will then examine the impact of this pledge on the negotiation of a Model Protocol to safeguards agreements. The paper will report how the U.S. chose to implement this pledge in terms of the specific provisions of the Model Protocol adopted by the Board, including the exclusion of activities of direct national security significance. Finally, the paper will examine the issues the U.S. faces in negotiating its own protocol, in particular the implementation of the national security exclusion, and the ways in which it is addressing these issues. (author)