Published June 2018 | Version v1
Journal article

IAEA safeguards at uranium mines provide more complete picture of countries' nuclear activities (Arabic Edition)

  • 1. International Atomic Energy Agency, Office of Public Information and Communication, Vienna (Austria)

Description

IAEA safeguards play an indispensable role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons by ensuring that nuclear material remains in peaceful use. Uranium mines and milling facilities handle large amounts of uranium; they are subject to IAEA verification in States with additional protocols to their comprehensive safeguards agreements. "Verification at uranium mines is performed in the context of consistency analysis," said Russell Leslie, an IAEA safeguards expert. "The information that is obtained during IAEA inspectors' access to uranium mines and mills is checked against State declarations and compared with all of the other safeguards-relevant information available to the IAEA, including inspection activities in the State, to assure that it is meeting its safeguards obligations." States accept safeguards through the conclusion of safeguards agreements. Safeguards inspectors only conduct verification at uranium mines in countries that have brought into force an additional protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement. The additional protocol strengthens the IAEA's verification capability by introducing additional measures — such as increased information about a State's nuclear fuel cycle activities and physical access to relevant locations in the State — to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. To date, 132 States have an additional protocol in force — including all countries with operational uranium mines. These countries are obliged to provide the IAEA with expanded information about their activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle and provide access to relevant locations, including uranium mines and uranium and thorium concentration plants. This enables the IAEA to build increased confidence in the peaceful nature of the country's nuclear programme. Under the additional protocol, inspectors gather information on the location and operational status of uranium mines and mills and estimate the total annual production capacity of uranium concentration plants. To verify the accuracy of this information, the IAEA may undertake what is known as complementary access to relevant mines and mills to provide further assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Availability note (English)

Also available on-line: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull59-2/5921415_ar.pdf

Additional details

Publishing Information

Journal Title
IAEA Bulletin (Online)
Journal Volume
59
Journal Issue
2
Journal Page Range
p. 14-15
ISSN
1564-2690

INIS

Optional Information

Notes
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