Published 1987 | Version v1
Report Restricted

A confirmatory measurement technique for HEU [highly enriched uranium]

Creators

Description

Precise measurements of the special nuclear material (SNM) in an item can be used to confirm that the item has not been tampered with. These measurements do not require a highly accurate calibration, but they should be based on an attribute that is unique to the SNM. We describe an instrument that performs gamma-ray measurements at three energies: 185.7 keV, 1001 keV, and 2614 keV. This instrument collects data for 200 s from shipping containers (208-l barrels). These measurements help to distinguish the issue of material control - Has any material been diverted? - from the issue of measurement control - Is there a measurement bias?

Availability note (English)

Available from NTIS, PC A02; 3 as DE88003166.

Files

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Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Pagination
8 p.
Report number
LA-UR--87-3839

Conference

Title
3. international conference on facility operations safeguards interface.
Dates
29 Nov - 4 Dec 1987.
Place
San Diego, CA (USA).

INIS

Country of Publication
United States
Country of Input or Organization
United States
INIS RN
19064257
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
ACCOUNTING; DETECTION; GAMMA DETECTION; GAMMA SPECTRA; HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM; NAI DETECTORS; NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; SAFEGUARDS
Descriptors DEC
ACTINIDES; ELEMENTS; ENRICHED URANIUM; ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS; MANAGEMENT; MATERIALS; MEASURING INSTRUMENTS; METALS; RADIATION DETECTION; RADIATION DETECTORS; SCINTILLATION COUNTERS; SOLID SCINTILLATION DETECTORS; SPECTRA; URANIUM

Optional Information

Notes
Paper copy only, copy does not permit microfiche production.
Secondary number(s)
CONF-871110--17.