Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

In order to compare several nuclear-safeguards verification approaches to one another and to the conventional facility-oriented approach, we establish a framework of the classes of information routinely verifiable by IAEA safeguards inspections. For each facility type within a State nuclear fuel cycle, the classes include flow data, inventory data, and shipper and receiver data. By showing which classes of information are verified for each facility type within three fuel cycles of different complexity, we distinguish the inspection approaches from one anoter and exhibit their fuel-cycle dependence, i.e., their need for sets of safeguards inspection activities different from those required under the facility-oriented approach at similar facilities in fuel cycles of differing complexity. Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 graphically depict these relations and give a qualitative summary of the relative effectiveness and effort requirements of the approaches classified. The zone, information-correlation, diversion-assumption-change, and randomization-over-facilities approaches depend intrinsically on the complexity of the fuel cycle: their very definition implies fuel-cycle dependence. The approaches involving randomization over activities and goal relaxations do not have such dependence