Are quantum-mechanical-like models possible, or necessary, outside quantum physics?

This article examines some experimental conditions that invite and possibly require recourse to quantum-mechanical-like mathematical models (QMLMs), models based on the key mathematical features of quantum mechanics, in scientific fields outside physics, such as biology, cognitive psychology, or economics. In particular, I consider whether the following two correlative features of quantum phenomena that were decisive for establishing the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics play similarly important roles in QMLMs elsewhere. The first is the individuality and discreteness of quantum phenomena, and the second is the irreducibly probabilistic nature of our predictions concerning them, coupled to the particular character of the probabilities involved, as different from the character of probabilities found in classical physics. I also argue that these features could be interpreted in terms of a particular form of epistemology that suspends and even precludes a causal and, in the first place, realist description of quantum objects and processes. This epistemology limits the descriptive capacity of quantum theory to the description, classical in nature, of the observed quantum phenomena manifested in measuring instruments. Quantum mechanics itself only provides descriptions, probabilistic in nature, concerning numerical data pertaining to such phenomena, without offering a physical description of quantum objects and processes. While QMLMs share their use of the quantum-mechanical or analogous mathematical formalism, they may differ by the roles, if any, the two features in question play in them and by different ways of interpreting the phenomena they considered and this formalism itself. This article will address those differences as well. (paper)