Published March 31, 2004 | Version v1
Journal article

Market efficiency, competition, and communication in electric power markets. Experimental results

  • 1. Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7801 (United States)
  • 2. Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996 (United States)
  • 3. Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 (United States)
  • 4. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 (United States)
  • 5. Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Decision Research, Cornell University, 428-B Philips Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 (United States)

Description

Economic theory gives no clear indication of the minimum number of producers necessary for a market to define competitive price-quantity equilibria, which approximate price equal to marginal cost. Previous work and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) guidelines generally suggest that 6-10 suppliers may be workably competitive. Our experiments with PowerWeb suggest that a higher number of suppliers may be necessary to approximate competitive market solutions, this in the absence of any communication among producers. As communications rules are altered to parallel differing types of antitrust enforcement, market results with 24 participants approach pure monopoly values

Additional details

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Ecological Economics
Journal Volume
48
Journal Issue
3
Journal Page Range
p. 317-327
ISSN
0921-8009
CODEN
ECECEM

INIS

Country of Publication
Netherlands
Country of Input or Organization
Netherlands
INIS RN
35049711
Subject category
S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
Descriptors DEI
COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; ELECTRIC POWER; ELECTRIC UTILITIES; MARGINAL-COST PRICING; MARKET; PRICES; USA
Descriptors DEC
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; NORTH AMERICA; POWER; PRICES; PUBLIC UTILITIES