Results 1 - 10 of 270
Results 1 - 10 of 270. Search took: 0.018 seconds
|Sort by: date | relevance|
[en] While uptake of renewable energies as a solution to climate change is widely discussed, the issue of public vs. private financing is not yet adequately explored. The debates over the Kyoto Protocol and its successor, culminating in the COP15 Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, maintained a strong preference for public over private financing. Yet it is also clear to most observers that the energy revolution will never happen without the involvement of private finance to drive private investment. In this Viewpoint, we discuss the ways in which private financing could be mobilized to drive the energy industrial revolution that is needed if climate change mitigation is to succeed.
[en] The European Union (EU) Commission has adopted a Green Paper to prepare the introduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading as a potential tool for climate change policy within the EU. When similar action was undertaken in the US Acid Rain Program in the beginning of the 1990s, the most controversial feature was that of initial allocation of permits. However, in the EU context, the political and economic implications have not been discussed in detail yet. Therefore, our contribution is to focus on a politically feasible allocation method by considering how these GHG permits should be allocated at both the national and at the power plant level. Our policy recommendation is twofold. First, a proportional rollback of the emissions defined by the Burden Sharing Agreement is a suitable starting point concerning allocation at the national level. Second, a common grandfathered distribution principle, such as an allocation of permits to individual power plants based on a percentage reduction of the current size of emissions, is to be preferred over an allocation principle based on past emissions. (author)
[en] The clean development mechanism (CDM) is a global collaborative action proposed at the Kyoto Protocol in response to climate change issues. The CDM contributes to cost-efficient reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries and promotes sustainable development in developing countries. Its fundamental framework is based on partnerships between industrialized and developing countries. This study employs social network analysis to investigate the dynamics of the partnership networks observed in 3816 CDM projects registered in the database of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change over the period of 2005 to 2011. Our three main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the CDM partnership network is a small world; however, its density tends to decrease as the number of participants for a CDM project decreases. Second, the partnership networks’ leading groups tend to shift from partner countries into host countries. Third, a host country that pursues more partnership-based projects takes better control of resources and knowledge-flow in the ego-network formed around that country, and can thus better utilize global resources for its CDM projects. - Highlights: ► We investigate dynamics of the international partnership networks of CDM projects. ► The density of CDM networks tends to decrease by time. ► The partnership networks’ leading groups tend to shift into host countries. ► A host country with more partnerships better utilizes global knowledge resources.
[en] Drawing on two conflicting hypotheses from the theoretical literature on lobbying, I consider the strategies applied by interest groups lobbying to influence climate policy in the European Union (EU). The first hypothesis claims that interest groups lobby their 'friends', decision-makers with positions similar to their own. The second claims that interest groups lobby their 'foes', decision-makers with positions opposed to their own. Using interviews with lobbyists and decision-makers, I demonstrate that in the field of climate policy, interest groups in the EU lobby both friends and foes, but under different conditions. Moreover, I find that the interest groups' motives are not always in line with the theoretical hypotheses. Interest groups lobby their friends on single policy decisions to exchange information, to further a common cause and to exert pressure, and their foes because a foe on one issue might prove to be a friend on another issue. Interest groups direct general lobbying towards both friends and foes. This paper provides a new empirical contribution to a literature that has so far been heavily dominated by studies focusing on lobbying in the US
[en] Carbon leakage is an important issue because it can reduce the environmental effectiveness of international climate agreements. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the clean development mechanism (CDM) can potentially reduce carbon leakage significantly. To what extent this potential can be realized depends on how the CDM baseline approach accounts for this effect. We use a computable general equilibrium model to analyze the impact of three different baseline approaches, and find that they produce diverging results as the number of CDM projects increase. We do, however, find that under realistic assumptions on the level of CDM activity the CDM will significantly reduce carbon leakage irrespective of which baseline approach is used
[en] Burden sharing in the actions needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has proved so far to be the most intractable problem in the implementation of the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. We analyzed the contribution of non-Annex I countries to the GHG emissions in the period 1850–2010 to assess their relative contribution to total GHG emissions. In the period 1850–1990 non-Annex I countries represented 44% of the total but this contribution increased in the period 1990–2010 to 56%. If we extrapolate present trends to 2030 they will represent 69% in the period 1990–2030. The “historical responsibility” of Annex I countries is therefore decreasing. If we take 1990 as the starting year in which the Climate Convention recognized clearly that greenhouse gases are interfering dangerously with the climate system, it is evident the need of non-Annex I countries to engage with Annex I countries in the effort to reduce emissions. We present three options for the burden sharing in such effort. -- Highlights: •Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol did not reduce global GHG emissions growth. •Defining burden sharing of emissions is key to the success of climate negotiations. •Accounting for historical emissions involves too many uncertainties. •Developed countries have already presented pledges to reduce their emissions by 2020. •Emissions of developing countries became dominant and they must act to reduce them
[en] The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the three greenhouse gas emission reduction and trading instruments of the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The CDM allows governments and business entities from developed countries to offset their emissions liabilities by reducing or avoiding emissions in developing countries, where it is often cheaper to do so. Our results reveal that the majority of the CDM projects utilise local sources of technology. We attempt to explain technology sourcing patterns in CDM projects through the use of knowledge based determinants. Our empirical analysis indicates that in countries with a stronger knowledge base in climate friendly technologies, CDM project implementers tend to use local, as well as a combination of local and foreign technologies, more than foreign technologies.
[en] Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol authorizes emissions trading, but the rules governing emissions trading have been deferred to subsequent conferences. In designing and implementing an international greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme, assigning liability rules has been considered to be one of the most challenging issues. In general, a seller-beware liability works well in a strong enforcement environment. In the Kyoto Protocol, however, it may not always work. By contrast, a buyer-beware liability could be an effective deterrent to non-compliance, but the costs of imposing it are expected to be very high. To strike a middle ground, we suggest a combination of preventive measures with strong but feasible end-of-period punishments to ensure compliance with the Kyoto emissions commitments. Such measures aim to maximize efficiency gains from emissions trading and at the same time, to minimize over-selling risks. (author)
[en] The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is expected to stimulate the North-South transfer of climate-friendly technologies. This paper provides an assessment of the technology transfers that take place through the CDM using a data set of 644 registered projects. It provides a detailed description of the transfers (frequency, type, by sector, by host country, etc.). It also includes an econometric analysis of their drivers. We show that transfer likeliness increases with the size of the projects. The transfer probability is 50% higher in projects implemented in a subsidiary of Annex 1 companies while the presence of an official credit buyer has a lower-albeit positive-impact. The analysis also yields interesting results on how technological capabilities of the host country influence technology diffusion in the CDM
[en] Transaction costs and institutional rigidities will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms compared to domestic greenhouse gas abatement options. The clean development mechanism (CDM) in particular is likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, project registration, verification and certification. The activities implemented jointly pilot phase and the prototype carbon fund programme give indications about these costs. There is evidence that projects with high implementation costs have high transaction costs as well. Moreover, CDM projects have to be approved by host country institutions, and so far only a small share of host countries has been able to set up these institutions. Several of the larger host countries intend to only approve projects if the market price is above a certain threshold. Some governments will also levy fees to finance costs of approval bodies. We assess these issues using a quantitative model of the Kyoto Protocol permit market. We conclude that while changes in demand from Annex B countries remain the crucial factor, the size of the CDM will depend to a significant degree on transaction costs and institutional barriers in host countries