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[en] The Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, is currently into force. On 12 February 2004, the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention signed the Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which has not yet entered into force. On 23 December 2010, the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention adopted this Expose des Motifs of the Brussels Supplementary Convention as amended by the 2004 Protocol, which is of an explanatory nature. Please note that there is no Expose des Motifs of the Brussels Supplementary Convention currently in force
[en] Reaching the goal of the Paris Agreement requires substantial investment. The developed country parties have agreed to provide USD$100 billion in climate finance annually from 2020 to 2025. Ongoing negotiations on post-2025 commitments are likely to exceed that sum and include a broader scope of parties. However, there is no guidance regarding the allocation of contributions. Here, we develop a dynamic mechanism based on two conventional pillars of a burden sharing mechanism: emission responsibility and ability to pay. The mechanism adds dynamic components that reflect the Paris principle to ‘ratchet-up’ ambition; it rewards countries with ambitious mitigation targets and relieves countries with a high degree of climate vulnerability. Including developed country parties only, we find that ten countries should bear 85% of climate finance contributions (65% if all parties to the Paris Agreement are included). In both scopes, increasing climate ambition is rewarded. If the EU increased its emission reduction target from 40% to 55% by 2030, member states could reduce their climate finance contributions by up to 3.3%. The proposed mechanism allows for an inclusion of sub-, supra- or non-state actors. For example, we find a contribution of USD$3.3 billion annually for conventionally excluded emissions from international aviation and shipping. (letter)
[en] The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, is currently in force and has an Expose des Motifs adopted in 1982, which is available on the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency web site. On 12 February 2004, the Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention signed the Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, which has not yet entered into force. On 18 November 2016, the Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention adopted this Expose des Motifs of the Paris Convention as amended by the 2004 Protocol, which is of an explanatory nature.
[en] The governments being parties to the convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, considering that the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, established within the framework of the OECD, is charged with encouraging the elaboration and harmonisation of legislation relating to nuclear energy in participating countries, in particular with regard to third party liability and insurance against atomic risks; desirous of ensuring adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage caused by nuclear incidents whilst taking the necessary steps to ensure that the development of the production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not thereby hindered; convinced of the need for unifying the basic rules applying in the various countries to the liability incurred for such damage, whilst leaving these countries free to take, on a national basis, any additional measures which they deem appropriate; have agreed the content of this convention
[en] Since the ‘Paris agreement’ in 2015 there has been much focus on what a +1.5 °C or +2 °C warmer world would look like. Since the focus lies on policy relevant global warming targets, or specific warming levels (SWLs), rather than a specific point in time, projections are pooled together to form SWL ensembles based on the target temperature rather than emission scenario. This study uses an ensemble of CMIP5 global model projections to analyse how well SWL ensembles represent the stabilized climate of global warming targets. The results show that the SWL ensembles exhibit significant trends that reflect the transient nature of the RCP scenarios. These trends have clear effect on the timing and clustering of monthly cold and hot extremes, even though the effect on the temperature of the extreme months is less visible. In many regions there is a link between choice of RCP scenario used in the SWL ensemble and climate change signal in the highest monthly temperatures. In other regions there is no such clear-cut link. From this we conclude that comprehensive analyses of what prospects the different global warming targets bring about will require stabilization scenarios. Awaiting such targeted scenarios we suggest that prudent use of SWL scenarios, taking their characteristics and limitations into account, may serve as reasonable proxies in many situations. (letter)
[en] This Recommendation was adopted at the 136. Session of the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy held on 19-20 April 2018. This Recommendation aims at strengthening the common understanding with regard to the definition of the term 'final stage of fabrication' in Article 1(a)(iv) of the Paris Convention and with regard to the temporal effect of the exclusion of radioisotopes which have reached the final stage of fabrication. The principle is that once the radioisotopes have reached the final stage of fabrication and have left the nuclear installation where they reached that stage (i.e. the 'nuclear installation of origin'), they will no longer be covered by the Paris Convention
[en] This Recommendation was adopted on 12 February 2004 by the Diplomatic Conference convened to adopt and sign the 2004 Protocols to amend the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Convention (Annex III of the Final Act of the Conference, which is available at www.oecd-nea.org/law/final-act-conference-revision-pc-bc.pdf). Full text of publication follows: The Conference, Considering that, pursuant to Article 15(b) of the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Paris Convention'), a Contracting Party may derogate from the provisions of that Convention insofar as compensation for nuclear damage is in excess of 700 million euro; Considering that, pursuant to Article 3(f) of the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Brussels Supplementary Convention'), a Contracting Party may not, in carrying out that Convention, make use of the right provided for in Article 15(b) of the Paris Convention to apply special conditions, other than those laid down in the Brussels Supplementary Convention itself, to the compensation of nuclear damage using funds referred to in that latter Convention; Desirous of clarifying the right of a Contracting Party to establish conditions of reciprocity for the compensation of nuclear damage using funds which remain available under the Paris Convention after having satisfied its obligations under the Brussels Supplementary Convention; Recommends that if a Contracting Party to the Brussels Supplementary Convention has satisfied its obligations under that Convention up to the amount referred to in Article 3(a) thereof, if the amount of nuclear damage to be compensated exceeds the aforementioned amount and if funds remain available, whether provided by insurance or other financial security pursuant to Article 10 of the Paris Convention or by public funds pursuant to national legislation enacted prior to the nuclear incident which requires that a specified amount of public funds will be provided to compensate nuclear damage, it should not make use of the right provided for in Article 15(b) of the Paris Convention to apply special conditions to the compensation of nuclear damage using such remaining funds in respect of: a) a State referred to in Article 2(a)(i), (ii) or (iv) of the Paris Convention which, at the time of the nuclear incident, has a nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zone established by it in accordance with international law and which affords reciprocal benefits of an equivalent amount; b) any other State which, at the time of the nuclear incident, has no nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zone established by it in accordance with international law; Recommends that the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention should notify the Secretary-General of the OECD of the steps that they have taken to implement this Recommendation; Invites the Secretary-General of the OECD to communicate any such notification to all Contracting Parties.
[en] We live a climate emergency. This is a fight for our lives. This is a fight we must win. Business as usual is no longer an option. Everywhere, people demand more vigorous and quick action to stop climate change. Everyone wants a sustainable future. Everyone wants to live on a clean, green and healthy planet. It is our responsibility to listen to them. And achieve results. We have very little time left. The window to act is closing fast, though 2019 and 2020 give us a chance, which could be the last. To stop runaway climate change, to avoid more weather disasters, to avoid more suffering, nations need to use all options at their disposal to update their climate action plans under the Paris Agreement by 2020. We need these plans to be much more ambitious than they are now. Because we are going in the wrong direction. We need to adapt to a changing climate. We need to stabilize the global temperature rise at 1.5°C. But we are on route to an increase of more than double. And this means an uncertain future for humanity. What is the conclusion? We need more climate ambition. And we need it now. Your conference provides an opportunity to advance. You can help those nations willing to do so to consider or strengthen their use of nuclear power.
[en] This document is France report on the demonstrable progresses made according to the enforcement of article 3 of the Kyoto protocol. With respect to previous available version, this version includes an additional introduction (chapter 1). Then chapter 2 describes the French climate policy, chapter 3 presents the trends and projections for the greenhouse gas emissions. Chapter 4 details the effects of the policies and measures implemented in the different sectors (energy, transports, industry and wastes). The last chapter is devoted to the respect of the other commitments of the Kyoto protocol, in particular the articles 10 and 11
[en] Highlights: • The energy policy debate is becoming more sophisticated and technical in terminology. • The debate on energy policies is increasingly ‘technology-driven’. • Renewable technologies are driving the debate in the last fifteen years. • Policy-makers will encounter troubles in addressing energy technological advancements. - Abstract: Since the Kyoto Protocol, there has been increasing attention by scholars on energy issues, with this trend having strong implications for policy. The design and implementation of energy policies depend on the underlying scientific literature and adapt to new stimuli and research findings. Energy challenges today and in the coming years will require the adoption of policy efforts across a range of different fields and technologies. The purpose of this paper is to provide an investigation of energy policy studies based on more than 22 thousand research products published between 1997 and 2017. This synthesis aims to improve the mutual understanding of the policy debate on diverse and multifaceted energy issues to allow more efficient, concerted and rapid action. Results highlight how the debate on energy policies is becoming increasingly ‘technology-driven’, that is more sophisticated and technical in its approach and terminology.