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[en] Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are gaining recognition among policymakers and industry players as a promising nuclear technology. SMRs can be defined as nuclear reactors with a power output between 10 MWe and 300 MWe that incorporate by design higher modularization, standardisation and factory-based construction levels enabling more predictable delivery models based on the economies of series. Today, more than 50 concepts are under development covering a wide range of technology approaches and maturity levels. The value proposition of the SMR technology also includes potential financing and system integration benefits. These attractive features, however, rely on a business case that requires the development of a global SMR market to become economically viable. Large-scale deployment of SMRs faces several technical, economic, regulatory and supply chain challenges and will need considerable governmental efforts and efficient international collaborative frameworks to be realised in the next decade.
[en] Regulatory Framework - National Regulations: Decree on licensing of nuclear facilities; About 40 regulation 25 of which are related to the nuclear facilities and activities; All regulations are under revision to ensure conformance with new regulatory infrastructure and framework and to update in accordance with latest IAEA requirements; Five Guidelines for the applicants; About 25 internal procedures, including review and assessment guidelines and Project Management Plans for ongoing authorization projects. Safety Regime - Bilateral Peaceful Use: USA, Canada, France, South Korea, Russia, Argentine, Germany, China, Jordan, Japan. Multilateral Safety Related: Nuclear Safety Convention; Paris Convention on Liability; Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; Joint Convention on Management of Spent Fuel and Management of Radioactive Waste (signed but not ratified yet non technical reason). Multilateral Security Related: Treaty on the Non proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ratification of Amendment to CPPNM is in - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty - International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Safeguards: Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with NPT; Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with NPT.
[en] During normal operations and particularly in the event of the unexpected, an adequate legal framework for the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology is indispensable. The national and international nuclear legal systems of today provide a legal framework for conducting activities related to nuclear energy and ionizing radiation in a manner that adequately protects individuals, property and the environment, and helps determine liability when something goes wrong. The 1986 Chornobyl accident prompted the swift adoption of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Early Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention), which form the legal basis for the international emergency preparedness and response framework. Further negotiations led to the adoption of the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention in 1988, as well as the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 1997. In addition, the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident catalyzed efforts to further strengthen the existing framework for nuclear liability and safety.
[en] 1. The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter called the 'Paris Convention') establishes a special regime assigning civil liability for damage incurred as a result of a nuclear incident and providing for the compensation of third parties who suffer damage as a result of such an incident. While the Paris Convention imposes a fairly high minimum liability amount upon the operator of a nuclear installation situated in the territory of a Contracting Party, it does not address the case where an incident may result in damages exceeding the amount of compensation available from the liable operator. Many Paris Convention States recognised that operator funds under the Paris Convention might not be adequate to compensate the damage suffered and that a supplementary system for compensating victims of a nuclear incident should be created. They favoured the establishment of an international system by which States would commit public funds in addition to those to be provided under the Paris Convention and the result was that on 31 January 1963, the Brussels Supplementary Convention was adopted. As its name implies, the Brussels Supplementary Convention is 'supplementary' to the Paris Convention. It establishes a system whereby compensation additional to that provided for under the Paris Convention is to be made available to victims who suffer nuclear damage as a result of a nuclear incident for which a Paris Convention nuclear operator is liable. The Brussels Supplementary Convention is subject to the provisions contained in the Paris Convention, including those which define the concepts of 'nuclear incident', 'nuclear installation' and 'nuclear damage', and no State may become or remain a Contracting Party to the Brussels Supplementary Convention unless it is a Contracting Party to the Paris Convention. Similarly, the Brussels Supplementary Convention will only remain in force for as long as the Paris Convention remains in force. 5. The Brussels Supplementary Convention increases the amount of compensation to be made available to victims where the amount called for under the Paris Convention is insufficient. It does so, first, by requiring the Contracting Party in whose territory the liable operator's nuclear installation is located to provide funds over and above those which the operator must make available under the Paris Convention, and secondly, by requiring all Contracting Parties collectively to make available an additional amount of compensation from public funds. In the first instance, the amount of funds to be provided by the Contracting Party in whose territory the liable operator's nuclear installation is located is the difference between the amount of the operator's liability under its national legislation and EUR 1 200 million, and in the second instance the additional compensation to be provided by the Contracting Parties collectively is EUR 300 million. Under the combined Paris-Brussels international nuclear liability regime therefore, a total of EUR 1 500 million is available to compensate victims of a nuclear accident.
[en] Recent improvements and harmonisation of legislation applicable to the back-end part of the nuclear fuel cycle nuclear power engineering in Slovakia are described. Slovak legislation has been putting stress on the creations of mechanisms enabling this part of nuclear power to be successfully and safely implemented by guaranteeing sufficient resources. Hence, the preconditions are foreseeability, continuous performance and long-term sustainability. A new Nuclear Fund Act (Act No. 308/2018) and Radiation Protection Act (Act No. 87/2018) have been adopted by the Slovak Parliament in 2018. The main points of the acts are outlined. (author)
[en] The Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, is currently into force. On 12 February 2004, the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention signed the Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which has not yet entered into force. On 23 December 2010, the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention adopted this Expose des Motifs of the Brussels Supplementary Convention as amended by the 2004 Protocol, which is of an explanatory nature. Please note that there is no Expose des Motifs of the Brussels Supplementary Convention currently in force
[en] The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, is currently in force and has an Expose des Motifs adopted in 1982, which is available on the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency web site. On 12 February 2004, the Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention signed the Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, which has not yet entered into force. On 18 November 2016, the Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention adopted this Expose des Motifs of the Paris Convention as amended by the 2004 Protocol, which is of an explanatory nature
[en] Article 10 of the Paris Convention, as amended by the 2004 Protocol (the 'revised Paris Convention') requires that nuclear operators financially cover their nuclear liability for the revised heads of damage under Article 2 of this Convention. Several options for the financial coverage are available in the nuclear insurance industry. Under certain conditions, described in Article 10(c) of the revised Paris Convention, the State, in the territory of which the nuclear operator is situated, may be required to provide 'the necessary funds to the extent that the insurance or other financial security is not available or sufficient to satisfy such claims'. For a better understanding of the information provided in this Table, the following clarifications may be useful: - Not Covered means that there is no insurance or other financial security available for the respective heads of damage; - a State guarantee means that the State will have provided a guarantee to the operator and that the State will therefore bear the risk of the operator's insolvency if the operator is required to reimburse the sums; - a State reinsurance means that the State will provide re-insurance to the operator's insurer(s), whether directly or through a state-owned reinsurer; - these two mechanisms may be combined (e.g. the State provides a guarantee to a State-owned reinsurer that will cover risks that are not covered by private insurance).
[en] The origins of a special international regime on civil liability for nuclear damage date back to the early 1960s, when the first international instruments, the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, were adopted under the auspices of the then Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency, respectively. Since the adoption of these instruments, improvements have been made to incorporate developments in the legal, technical and economic aspects of nuclear liability. In particular, in 1997 the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage was amended, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage was adopted. At the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, held in Vienna in July 2003, however, it was noted, inter alia, that there were a number of liability related conventions to which many States were Parties but many others were not and that the provisions of the liability conventions, and the relationships between them, were not simple to understand. It was suggested, therefore, that the preparation of explanatory texts on these instruments would assist in developing a common understanding of the complex legal issues involved and thereby promote wider adherence to these instruments. In the light of the above, and with a view to fostering an effective global nuclear liability regime, the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) was established in September 2003. Since its establishment, INLEX has held a series of meetings during the course of which it, inter alia, finalized explanatory texts on the nuclear liability instruments concluded under the IAEA’s auspices in 1997. The Group recommended the circulation of the explanatory texts to Member States as constituting a comprehensive study of the IAEA’s nuclear liability regime. The texts as originally adopted in 2004 are available in all the IAEA’s official languages as document GOV/INF/2004/9-GC(48)/INF/5. Following a request by Member States reflected in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, in 2012 INLEX adopted a number of recommendations on how to facilitate achievement of a global nuclear liability regime. In addition, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage entered into force on 15 April 2015. The explanatory texts were first updated in 2017 in the light of these important developments, and this second revision reflects further discussions within INLEX. It is hoped that the texts and the other documents included in this publication will increase awareness of nuclear liability as an important aspect of nuclear law by becoming a useful tool for legislators, government officials, technical experts, lawyers and nuclear insurers.
[en] This Recommendation was adopted on 12 February 2004 by the Diplomatic Conference convened to adopt and sign the 2004 Protocols to amend the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Convention (Annex III of the Final Act of the Conference, which is available at www.oecd-nea.org/law/final-act-conference-revision-pc-bc.pdf). Full text of publication follows: The Conference, Considering that, pursuant to Article 15(b) of the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Paris Convention'), a Contracting Party may derogate from the provisions of that Convention insofar as compensation for nuclear damage is in excess of 700 million euro; Considering that, pursuant to Article 3(f) of the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Brussels Supplementary Convention'), a Contracting Party may not, in carrying out that Convention, make use of the right provided for in Article 15(b) of the Paris Convention to apply special conditions, other than those laid down in the Brussels Supplementary Convention itself, to the compensation of nuclear damage using funds referred to in that latter Convention; Desirous of clarifying the right of a Contracting Party to establish conditions of reciprocity for the compensation of nuclear damage using funds which remain available under the Paris Convention after having satisfied its obligations under the Brussels Supplementary Convention; Recommends that if a Contracting Party to the Brussels Supplementary Convention has satisfied its obligations under that Convention up to the amount referred to in Article 3(a) thereof, if the amount of nuclear damage to be compensated exceeds the aforementioned amount and if funds remain available, whether provided by insurance or other financial security pursuant to Article 10 of the Paris Convention or by public funds pursuant to national legislation enacted prior to the nuclear incident which requires that a specified amount of public funds will be provided to compensate nuclear damage, it should not make use of the right provided for in Article 15(b) of the Paris Convention to apply special conditions to the compensation of nuclear damage using such remaining funds in respect of: a) a State referred to in Article 2(a)(i), (ii) or (iv) of the Paris Convention which, at the time of the nuclear incident, has a nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zone established by it in accordance with international law and which affords reciprocal benefits of an equivalent amount; b) any other State which, at the time of the nuclear incident, has no nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zone established by it in accordance with international law; Recommends that the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention should notify the Secretary-General of the OECD of the steps that they have taken to implement this Recommendation; Invites the Secretary-General of the OECD to communicate any such notification to all Contracting Parties.