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[en] This event was a unique opportunity to continue exploring the practical application of the international nuclear liability conventions and national legislations in the case that a nuclear incident should occur at a nuclear installation and cause transboundary nuclear damage. More specifically, the workshop assessed the determination of the nuclear damage to be compensated and transboundary claims handling, in order for the participants to understand the challenges involved and discuss views and options to ensure an adequate compensation of victims in the case that such a nuclear incident were to occur. With regard to the determination of nuclear damage, the aim was to discuss in different sessions the meaning of each of the following heads (or types) of damage that have been included in the post-Chernobyl versions of the nuclear liability conventions: loss of life or personal injury; loss of or damage to property; economic loss; costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment; costs of preventive measures. The purpose of the workshop was to identify: what could be considered in practice as 'nuclear damage', the challenges that could be raised by some heads of damage that are difficult to determine or may potentially be compensated under different heads of damage, whether a system to determine what nuclear damage is should be set up in the case of a nuclear accident to help avoid disputes and litigations. The workshop also addressed the administrative challenges of handling nuclear damage compensation claims
[en] A special legislation on criminal liability for offences against critical infrastructure objects is currently under development in Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted the Concept for the development of a state system for critical infrastructure protection.The paper considers this legal area with regard to objects in the nuclear industry in the general context of critical infrastructure protection. It provides the current state in the legal regulation of fundamentals of criminal liability for offences against the critical infrastructure objects in the nuclear industry. The issue on the sufficiency and appropriateness of the existing level of such a liability is discussed further.The paper presents the list of some main critical infrastructure objects in accordance with the regulatory documents in the sphere of critical infrastructure protection and their classification.In addition, such concepts as “critical infrastructure” (relatively new notion in the national legislation), “unlawful intrusion”, “computer crimes”, “critical information infrastructure” and other concepts important to the nuclear industry were considered in this research. The notions presented in different regulatory documents were analyzed.The paper emphasizes that the legislation of Ukraine does not currently present special (separate) standards on the criminal liability for offences against critical infrastructure objects. Some promising issues related to fundamentals of the criminal liability and protection of critical infrastructure objects in the nuclear industry were also considered.The research involves the prospect of further development of a special law to define the area for improving relevant legislation on general regulation of these issues.The paper also stresses on the need to introduce some changes to the Criminal Code of Ukraine with respect to certain articles of section XIV. (author)
[en] This section treats of the following Intergovernmental organisation activities: 1 - European Atomic Energy Community - Institutional issues and regulatory proposals: Communication on a more efficient and democratic decision-making in EU energy and climate policy; Published studies: Study for the European Parliament PETI Committee: 'Cross-border nuclear safety, liability and cooperation in the European Union'; European Study on Medical, Industrial and Research Applications of Nuclear and Radiation Technology. 2 - International Atomic Energy Agency - Nuclear safety: Organizational Meeting for the Eighth Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety; Officers' Turnover Meeting; Nuclear security: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment; International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material; Nuclear liability: Workshops on civil liability for nuclear damage; International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX); Legislative assistance. 3 - OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: NEA Nuclear Education, Skills and Technology Framework (NEST) Agreement enters into force; 2019 International Nuclear Law Essentials (INLE)
[en] The principal activities of EDF Energy Holdings Limited and subsidiaries together during the year continued to be the provision and supply of electricity and gas to commercial, residential and industrial customers, and the generation of electricity through a portfolio of generation assets including nuclear, coal, gas and renewable generation. The Group is also involved in the construction of nuclear new build assets. This document is EDF Energy group annual report for the year 2018. It includes: the Strategic report, the Directors' report, the Directors' responsibilities statement, the independent Auditor's report to the Members of EDF Energy Holdings Limited, the Consolidated income statement, the Consolidated statement of comprehensive income, the Consolidated balance sheet, the Consolidated cash flow statement, the Consolidated statement of changes in equity, the Notes to the consolidated financial statements, the Company balance sheet, the Company statement of changes in equity, and the Notes to the Company financial statements
[en] This report on nuclear energy and the environment is jointly released by the Chinese Academy of Engineering, the National Academy of Technologies of France and the French Academy of sciences. It is a second collaborative study of the three academies on nuclear energy matters. The first report, issued in August 2017, covered many aspects of nuclear energy and offered joint, mostly technical, recommendations for the direction of nuclear energy in the future. It was an attempt to provide an objective overview of many scientific and technological issues on nuclear energy (its position in the future energy mix, benefits, strengths and weak points, research and development perspectives, technology and safety, engineering etc.), as well as societal issues (education, training, risk perception, public awareness etc.). But it was admittedly far from being exhaustive. Environmental issues were not considered in sufficient depth in the previous report despite their being crucial for the future of this industry, and the Academies felt it necessary to pursue their cooperation and further address these important issues. They decided to focus the joint effort on the environmental impacts of nuclear energy in normal and accidental situations, including waste and provide a comprehensive analysis of these issues which are essentially similar in France and China. However, the economics of energy production, which also constitutes an important factor for the future, is determined by local and regional conditions, which are fairly different between these two countries, and it was deliberately decided not to address this issue in this joint study
[en] The Nuclear Safety and Security Working Group (NSSG) wishes to raise to the Leaders the following nuclear safety and security issues in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 1/ The NSSG stresses the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the need for the robust implementation by all states of the highest nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation standards to ensure the continued and responsible use of nuclear energy worldwide. 2/ The NSSG expects all States, in particular embarking countries, to take the necessary steps to be party to and fully implement the relevant international nuclear safety and security conventions and comprehensive safeguards agreements, including the IAEA additional protocol, and to empower an independent safety regulator. Of particular importance is the establishment of a solid legal framework respecting the requirements of independence and transparency with a clearly defined process for regulatory decisions. The NSSG encourages embarking countries to host IAEA peer review missions and follow-ups missions as their nuclear programs develop, to assure maximum transparency on the outcomes of these missions, as appropriate, and to implement the corresponding recommendations. 3/ The NSSG is very concerned that no progress has been made on the restoration of the legal independence of the Ukrainian nuclear regulator (SNRIU) regarding licensing and inspections. The NSSG recalls also that the international support that Ukraine is able to receive is limited by the continued lack of legal SNRIU independence. 4/ The NSSG underlines the requirement to ensure the long term availability of sustainable high-level scientific expertise to support nuclear safety decisions by licensees and competent authorities. This availability is becoming a concern and is particularly acute as nuclear safety research facilities throughout the world are ageing and, for some of them, closing down. The NSSG highlights that all nuclear safety organizations in G7 countries deem necessary to invest in science-based and long-term research dedicated to nuclear safety and radiation protection, and to foster international cooperation, including through the NEA and IAEA, in order to guarantee the availability and to optimize the use of research capacities and related skills. Governments need to support this effort in the long term. 5/ The NSSG highlights that ageing management constitutes a challenge as more than 20% of current nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the world are already 40 years old and beyond. The NSSG encourages benchmarking and information exchanges on the corresponding issues. The NSSG recognizes the value of the European Topical Peer Review (TPR) on ageing management and encourages other countries, as appropriate, to engage in similar processes and to take their results into account during the revision of IAEA safety standards. The NSSG also highlights the fact that it is crucial to consider an appropriate ageing management of all nuclear installations, such as the research reactors or facilities and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. 6/ The G7/NSSG welcomes the completion of the New Safe Confinement (NSC) project and, after the successful completion of the last commissioning tests, the imminent hand-over of the responsibility of the facility to Ukraine. It is a major milestone in the program funded by the international community to convert the Chernobyl site into a stable and environmentally safe condition. To achieve this outstanding result, the spirit of constructive collaboration that animated all the partners involved was decisive, starting from the EBRD in the role of manager of the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, the Customer SSE Chernobyl NPP, assisted by the Project Management Unit, and the Main Contractor together with some key sub-contractors, who have successfully implemented the NSC, a work of engineering without precedent in the field of nuclear construction.
[en] The 36th edition of the collection of texts on nuclear law and radiation protection contains, in addition to the Atomic Energy Act, the new Radiation Protection Act as a regular law of equal rank, in which, among other things, the previous subjects of regulation of the Radiation Protection Ordinance (RöV) and the Radiation Protection Ordinance (StrlSchV) are brought together. In addition to a detailed introduction, the new Radiation Protection Ordinance, the Emergency Dose Value Ordinance, the Nuclear Disposal Ordinance as well as the Ordinance on Protection against Harmful Effects of Non-Ionising Radiation in Human Applications have been added to the collection. The collection is supplemented by the relevant ancillary right and the Länder regulations on the enforcement of nuclear regulations.
[de]Die Textsammlung Atomrecht und Strahlenschutz enthält in der 36. Auflage neben dem Atomgesetz als gleichrangiges Stammgesetz das neue Strahlenschutzgesetz, in dem u.a. die bisherigen Regelungsgegenstände der RöV und StrlSchV zusammengeführt sind. Neben einer ausführlichen Einführung neu in die Sammlung aufgenommen wurden die neue Strahlenschutzverordnung, die Notfall-Dosiswerte-Verordnung, die Atomrechtliche Entsorgungsverordnung, sowie die Verordnung zum Schutz vor schädlichen Wirkungen nichtionisierender Strahlung bei der Anwendung am Menschen. Das relevante Nebenrecht und die Zuständigkeitsregelungen der Länder zum Vollzug atomrechtlicher Vorschriften ergänzen die Sammlung.
[en] This section treats of the following case laws: 1 - Belgium - Raad van State [Council of State], 24 May 2018, nr. 241.575: In the case brought before the Belgian Council of State, the claimant, Greenpeace Belgium, contested the legality of an authorisation for the transport of spent fuel delivered by the regulator, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC). 2 - France - Cherbourg high court (Tribunal de grande instance), 16 October 2018, No. 18-00061: In 2016, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and AREVA NC (now ORANO CYCLE) signed a trade agreement on the reprocessing of spent fuel from an ANSTO research reactor. France and Australia agreed on the organisation of this reprocessing in a 23 November 2017 bilateral agreement that was published in the Journal Officiel [Official Journal] by decree on 6 July 2018. In September 2018, Greenpeace France asked ORANO CYCLE to view the contract signed between ORANO CYCLE and ANSTO. When this request was denied, Greenpeace France brought an action for summary judgement at the Cherbourg High Court to receive the various contracts signed within the framework of the trade agreement. 3 - Japan - Decision by the Hiroshima High Court on appeal regarding the operation of the Ikata nuclear power plant: On 25 September 2018, the Hiroshima High Court (HC) overturned an earlier decision of the Hiroshima HC, where the HC issued a preliminary injunction to halt operations of the Ikata nuclear power plant (NPP). The Hiroshima HC's September 2018 decision on appeal allowed the restart of the Ikata NPP. 4 - United States - Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power Company, Imamura v. General Electric Company, and other US lawsuits related to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident: Since the last report on two lawsuits then pending in US federal courts related to the 2011 TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, there have been more developments that now involve five actions brought in US District Courts in California, the District of Columbia and Massachusetts. These lawsuits were initiated even though Japan's nuclear liability law channels liability for nuclear damage exclusively to nuclear operators and provides for unlimited liability. They have been allowed to proceed because the United States and Japan were not both parties to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage at the time of the Fukushima NPP accident. The CSC and other international nuclear liability conventions provide that jurisdiction over nuclear damage actions lies only with courts of the contracting party within whose territory the nuclear incident occurred. 5 - State of Nevada v. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and David A. Wright, No. 18-1232 (unpublished) (DC Cir. 2019): The state of Nevada filed a petition for review challenging a decision by Commissioner David Wright of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) not to recuse himself from the licensing proceeding for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada