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[en] This event was a unique opportunity to continue exploring the practical application of the international nuclear liability conventions and national legislations in the case that a nuclear incident should occur at a nuclear installation and cause transboundary nuclear damage. More specifically, the workshop assessed the determination of the nuclear damage to be compensated and transboundary claims handling, in order for the participants to understand the challenges involved and discuss views and options to ensure an adequate compensation of victims in the case that such a nuclear incident were to occur. With regard to the determination of nuclear damage, the aim was to discuss in different sessions the meaning of each of the following heads (or types) of damage that have been included in the post-Chernobyl versions of the nuclear liability conventions: loss of life or personal injury; loss of or damage to property; economic loss; costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment; costs of preventive measures. The purpose of the workshop was to identify: what could be considered in practice as 'nuclear damage', the challenges that could be raised by some heads of damage that are difficult to determine or may potentially be compensated under different heads of damage, whether a system to determine what nuclear damage is should be set up in the case of a nuclear accident to help avoid disputes and litigations. The workshop also addressed the administrative challenges of handling nuclear damage compensation claims
[en] The governments being parties to the convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, considering that the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, established within the framework of the OECD, is charged with encouraging the elaboration and harmonisation of legislation relating to nuclear energy in participating countries, in particular with regard to third party liability and insurance against atomic risks; desirous of ensuring adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage caused by nuclear incidents whilst taking the necessary steps to ensure that the development of the production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not thereby hindered; convinced of the need for unifying the basic rules applying in the various countries to the liability incurred for such damage, whilst leaving these countries free to take, on a national basis, any additional measures which they deem appropriate; have agreed the content of this convention
[en] The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, is currently in force and has an Expose des Motifs adopted in 1982, which is available on the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency web site. On 12 February 2004, the Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention signed the Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, which has not yet entered into force. On 18 November 2016, the Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention adopted this Expose des Motifs of the Paris Convention as amended by the 2004 Protocol, which is of an explanatory nature.
[en] This Recommendation was adopted at the 136. Session of the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy held on 19-20 April 2018. This Recommendation aims at strengthening the common understanding with regard to the definition of the term 'final stage of fabrication' in Article 1(a)(iv) of the Paris Convention and with regard to the temporal effect of the exclusion of radioisotopes which have reached the final stage of fabrication. The principle is that once the radioisotopes have reached the final stage of fabrication and have left the nuclear installation where they reached that stage (i.e. the 'nuclear installation of origin'), they will no longer be covered by the Paris Convention
[en] The discovery of nuclear reactions at the end of the 19. century lead to the apparition of a whole set of new activities in the fields of medicine, industry, research and defense. Nuclear law allows the exploitation of nuclear reactions while limiting their noxious effects. Multiple issues are at stake when it comes to nuclear law, as it holds sway over domains such as the safety of nuclear installations, the responsibility of managers, the protection of human health and environment, and also the information and participation of the public. This paper highlights the distinctive features of nuclear law, and demonstrates the autonomy of this division of law. Nuclear law is autonomous when derogatory rules of common law are applicable. It translates into the existence of principles of its own. This autonomy can also be based on specificities linked to the sources, the characters, and the overall purposes. The autonomy of nuclear law remains limited, as common elements with other laws can be identified. It is the case, for instance, of the principles of prevention, protection and sustainable development. The autonomy of nuclear law thus leads to interrogations on the real impact of broader concepts, especially the concept of legal system. (author)
[fr]La decouverte des reactions nucleaires a la fin du XIXe siecle est a l'origine de l'apparition d'un ensemble de nouvelles activites concernant la medecine, l'industrie, la recherche ou la defense. Le droit nucleaire permet l'exploitation des reactions nucleaires en limitant leurs effets nefastes. Les enjeux relatifs au droit nucleaire sont multiples puisqu'il regit des domaines tels que la surete des installations nucleaires de base, la responsabilite des exploitants, la protection de la sante humaine et de l'environnement ou encore l'information et la participation du public. Cette these met en evidence les particularites du droit nucleaire et participe a en demontrer l'autonomie. Celle-ci apparait lorsque sont applicables des regles derogatoires du droit commun et elle se traduit principalement par l'existence de principes propres. Elle peut aussi proceder de particularites liees aux sources, aux caracteres, ou aux finalites poursuivies. L'autonomie du droit nucleaire souffre cependant de limites puisque des elements communs avec d'autres droits peuvent etre identifies comme c'est le cas pour les principes de prevention, de protection ou de developpement durable. Le caractere autonome du droit nucleaire conduit ainsi a s'interroger sur la portee reelle de concepts plus larges et notamment celui de systeme juridique. (auteur)
[en] This Recommendation was adopted on 12 February 2004 by the Diplomatic Conference convened to adopt and sign the 2004 Protocols to amend the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Convention (Annex III of the Final Act of the Conference, which is available at www.oecd-nea.org/law/final-act-conference-revision-pc-bc.pdf). Full text of publication follows: The Conference, Considering that, pursuant to Article 15(b) of the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Paris Convention'), a Contracting Party may derogate from the provisions of that Convention insofar as compensation for nuclear damage is in excess of 700 million euro; Considering that, pursuant to Article 3(f) of the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Brussels Supplementary Convention'), a Contracting Party may not, in carrying out that Convention, make use of the right provided for in Article 15(b) of the Paris Convention to apply special conditions, other than those laid down in the Brussels Supplementary Convention itself, to the compensation of nuclear damage using funds referred to in that latter Convention; Desirous of clarifying the right of a Contracting Party to establish conditions of reciprocity for the compensation of nuclear damage using funds which remain available under the Paris Convention after having satisfied its obligations under the Brussels Supplementary Convention; Recommends that if a Contracting Party to the Brussels Supplementary Convention has satisfied its obligations under that Convention up to the amount referred to in Article 3(a) thereof, if the amount of nuclear damage to be compensated exceeds the aforementioned amount and if funds remain available, whether provided by insurance or other financial security pursuant to Article 10 of the Paris Convention or by public funds pursuant to national legislation enacted prior to the nuclear incident which requires that a specified amount of public funds will be provided to compensate nuclear damage, it should not make use of the right provided for in Article 15(b) of the Paris Convention to apply special conditions to the compensation of nuclear damage using such remaining funds in respect of: a) a State referred to in Article 2(a)(i), (ii) or (iv) of the Paris Convention which, at the time of the nuclear incident, has a nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zone established by it in accordance with international law and which affords reciprocal benefits of an equivalent amount; b) any other State which, at the time of the nuclear incident, has no nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zone established by it in accordance with international law; Recommends that the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention should notify the Secretary-General of the OECD of the steps that they have taken to implement this Recommendation; Invites the Secretary-General of the OECD to communicate any such notification to all Contracting Parties.
[en] The Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, is currently into force. On 12 February 2004, the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention signed the Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which has not yet entered into force. On 23 December 2010, the Contracting Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention adopted this Expose des Motifs of the Brussels Supplementary Convention as amended by the 2004 Protocol, which is of an explanatory nature. Please note that there is no Expose des Motifs of the Brussels Supplementary Convention currently in force
[en] 1. The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter called the 'Paris Convention') establishes a special regime assigning civil liability for damage incurred as a result of a nuclear incident and providing for the compensation of third parties who suffer damage as a result of such an incident. While the Paris Convention imposes a fairly high minimum liability amount upon the operator of a nuclear installation situated in the territory of a Contracting Party, it does not address the case where an incident may result in damages exceeding the amount of compensation available from the liable operator. Many Paris Convention States recognised that operator funds under the Paris Convention might not be adequate to compensate the damage suffered and that a supplementary system for compensating victims of a nuclear incident should be created. They favoured the establishment of an international system by which States would commit public funds in addition to those to be provided under the Paris Convention and the result was that on 31 January 1963, the Brussels Supplementary Convention was adopted. As its name implies, the Brussels Supplementary Convention is 'supplementary' to the Paris Convention. It establishes a system whereby compensation additional to that provided for under the Paris Convention is to be made available to victims who suffer nuclear damage as a result of a nuclear incident for which a Paris Convention nuclear operator is liable. The Brussels Supplementary Convention is subject to the provisions contained in the Paris Convention, including those which define the concepts of 'nuclear incident', 'nuclear installation' and 'nuclear damage', and no State may become or remain a Contracting Party to the Brussels Supplementary Convention unless it is a Contracting Party to the Paris Convention. Similarly, the Brussels Supplementary Convention will only remain in force for as long as the Paris Convention remains in force. 5. The Brussels Supplementary Convention increases the amount of compensation to be made available to victims where the amount called for under the Paris Convention is insufficient. It does so, first, by requiring the Contracting Party in whose territory the liable operator's nuclear installation is located to provide funds over and above those which the operator must make available under the Paris Convention, and secondly, by requiring all Contracting Parties collectively to make available an additional amount of compensation from public funds. In the first instance, the amount of funds to be provided by the Contracting Party in whose territory the liable operator's nuclear installation is located is the difference between the amount of the operator's liability under its national legislation and EUR 1 200 million, and in the second instance the additional compensation to be provided by the Contracting Parties collectively is EUR 300 million. Under the combined Paris-Brussels international nuclear liability regime therefore, a total of EUR 1 500 million is available to compensate victims of a nuclear accident.
[en] Highlights: •Reviews third-party nuclear liability regimes currently in operation. •Analyses the international nuclear liability regime following Fukushima Daiichi. •Comparatively assesses the liability regimes for nuclear and non-nuclear energy. •Presents the future outlook for developments in the global nuclear liability regime. -- Abstract: Nuclear liability regimes are important as they ensure that potential victims will be compensated promptly and efficiently after a nuclear accident. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan in 2011 prompted a review of the global nuclear liability regime that remains on-going. Progress has been slow, but over the next few years the European Union is set to announce its new proposals. Meanwhile, in 2015, another global nuclear liability regime, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, has entered into force. This paper aims to move the debate in the literature on nuclear liability and focuses on the four following major issues: (1) reviews third-party nuclear liability regimes currently in operation around the world; (2) analyses the international nuclear liability regime following the accident at Fukushima Daiichi; (3) comparatively assesses the liability regimes for nuclear energy and the non-nuclear energy sector; and (4) presents the future outlook for possible developments in the global nuclear liability regime.
[en] 1. India has had no special legislation so far about liability under civil law for nuclear damage. Instead, the general law about damages outside of contractual provisions applied. 2. The ambitious Indian civil nuclear program requires intensified international cooperation. The potential partners in that cooperation demand that liability regulations be adopted on the basis of the principles of the international nuclear liability conventions so as to grant legal assurance to their export industries. 3. In May 2010, draft liability legislation was introduced into the Indian parliament. Final deliberations were held on August 30, 2010. On September 21, 2010, the President confirmed the draft legislation, thereby making it law. The draft legislation had been a matter of dispute in India from the outset. 4. The law applies to nuclear facilities owned or controlled by the Indian central government. Only the government or government institutions or state-owned companies can be owners of a nuclear facility. The owner is liable without fault having to be proven. The details of liability follow the provisions of the liability conventions. 5. The law provides for legal channelling of liability to the owner of a nuclear facility. 6. Regular courts of law have no competence to rule about claims for damages under the law. Instead, a 'Claims Commissioner' appointed ad hoc by the government, or a 'Nuclear Claims Commission,' are competent. 7. The 2010 Indian nuclear liability law is a piece of legislation with deficiencies. Key elements are incompatible with the principles of international nuclear liability regimes. (orig.)