[en] The Director General has received a letter dated 14 March 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the Agency and, as requested therein, the letter is attached hereto for the information of Member States

[en] At the request of the outgoing Chairperson of the Board of Governors, her statement delivered in the Board of Governors meeting on 22 September 2009, regarding the working arrangements of the Board, is reproduced herewith for information

[en] This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (LBP), the Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and the Decisions on Petitions for Rulemaking (DPRM). The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported herein are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or have any independent legal significance

[en] This is the final report on the series of operations which culminated with the delivery of the Plasma Separation Process prototype magnet system (PMS) to Building K1432 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This procedure included real time monitoring of the cold mass support strut strain gauges and an in-cab rider to monitor the instrumentation and direct the driver. The primary technical consideration for these precautions was the possibility of low frequency resonant vibration of the cold mass when excited by symmetrical rough road conditions at specific speeds causing excess stress levels in the support struts and consequent strut failure. A secondary consideration was the possibility of high acceleration loads due to sudden stops, severe road conditions, of impacts. The procedure for moving and transportation to ORNL included requirements for real time continuous monitoring of the eight strut stain gauges and three external accelerometers. Because the strain gauges had not been used since the original magnet cooldown, it was planned to verify their integrity during magnet warmup. The measurements made from the strut strain gauges resulted in stress values that were physically impossible. It was concluded that further evaluation was necessary to verify the usefulness of these gauges and whether they might be faulty. This was accomplished during the removal of the magnet from the building. 6 figs., 1 tab

[en] In the past, the selection of representative accidents for refined analysis from the numerous scenarios identified in hazards analyses (HAs) has involved significant judgment and has been difficult to defend. As part of upgrading the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the TA-55 plutonium facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, an accident selection process was developed that is mostly mechanical and reproducible in nature and fulfills the requirements of the Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 3009 and DOE Order 5480.23. Among the objectives specified by this guidance are the requirements that accident screening (1) consider accidents during normal and abnormal operating conditions, (2) consider both design basis and beyond design basis accidents, (3) characterize accidents by category (operational, natural phenomena, etc.) and by type (spill, explosion, fire, etc.), and (4) identify accidents that bound all foreseeable accident types. The accident selection process described here in the context of the TA-55 FSAR is applicable to all types of DOE facilities

[en] By resolution GC(IV)/RES/62 the General Conference decided that the Agency's annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations for 1959-60 would consist of the annual report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference for 1959-60, together with a supplement. The annual report of the Board has been issued as document GC(IV)/ 114. The present document contains the supplement which deals with developments in the Agency's work during the period 1 July to 30 September 1960, including action taken by the General Conference at its fourth regular session

[en] Footnote 2 on page 2 of the Attachment to INFCIRC/2/Rev.56 should read as follows: 'Nicaragua withdrew from the Agency with effect from 14 December 1970, it became a Member again on 25 March 1977.'

[en] The document lists the 70 Members which, by 30 September 2002, had accepted the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as provided for in Section 38 thereof. The list is followed by the texts of declarations/reservations made to the Agreement

[en] This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, the Administrative Law Judges, the Directors' Decisions, and the Decisions on Petitions for Rulemaking

[en] The purpose of the Regulatory Research and Support Program is to augment and extend the capability of the Atomic Energy Control Board's (AECB) regulatory program beyond the capability of in-house resources. The overall objective of the program is to produce pertinent and independent scientific and other knowledge and expertise that will assist the AECB in making correct, timely and credible decisions on regulating the development, application and use of atomic energy. The objectives are achieved through contracted research, development, studies, consultant and other kinds of projects administered by the Research and Radiation Protection Branch (RRB) of the AECB