[en] This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (LBP), the Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and the Decisions on Petitions for Rulemaking (DPRM). The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported herein are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or have any independent legal significance

[en] This is the final report on the series of operations which culminated with the delivery of the Plasma Separation Process prototype magnet system (PMS) to Building K1432 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This procedure included real time monitoring of the cold mass support strut strain gauges and an in-cab rider to monitor the instrumentation and direct the driver. The primary technical consideration for these precautions was the possibility of low frequency resonant vibration of the cold mass when excited by symmetrical rough road conditions at specific speeds causing excess stress levels in the support struts and consequent strut failure. A secondary consideration was the possibility of high acceleration loads due to sudden stops, severe road conditions, of impacts. The procedure for moving and transportation to ORNL included requirements for real time continuous monitoring of the eight strut stain gauges and three external accelerometers. Because the strain gauges had not been used since the original magnet cooldown, it was planned to verify their integrity during magnet warmup. The measurements made from the strut strain gauges resulted in stress values that were physically impossible. It was concluded that further evaluation was necessary to verify the usefulness of these gauges and whether they might be faulty. This was accomplished during the removal of the magnet from the building. 6 figs., 1 tab

[en] This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (LBP), the Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and the Decisions on Petitions for Rulemaking (DPRM). The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported herein are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or have any independent legal significance

[en] This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (LBP), the Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and the Decisions on Petitions for Rulemaking (DPRM). The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported herein are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or have any independent legal significance

[en] This document provides information regarding the source and the estimated quantity of potential airborne radionuclide emissions resulting from the operation of the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility. The construction of the CVD Facility is scheduled to commence on or about December 1996, and will be completed when the process begins operation. This document serves as a Notice of Construction (NOC) pursuant to the requirements of 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 61 for the CVD Facility. About 80 percent of the U.S. Department of Energy's spent nuclear fuel (SNF) inventory is stored under water in the Hanford Site K Basins. Spent nuclear fuel in the K West Basin is contained in closed canisters, while the SNF in the K East Basin is in open canisters, which allow release of corrosion products to the K East Basin water. Storage of the current inventory in the K Basins was originally intended to be on an as-needed basis to sustain operation of the N Reactor while the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant was refurbished and restarted. The decision in December 1992 to deactivate the PURF-X Plant left approximately 2,100 MT (2,300 tons) of uranium as part of the N Reactor SNF in the K Basins with no means for near-term removal and processing. The CVD Facility will be constructed in the 100 Area northwest of the 190 K West Building, which is in close proximity to the K East and K West Basins (Figures 1 and 08572). The CVD Facility will consist of five processing bays, with four of the bays fully equipped with processing equipment and the fifth bay configured as an open spare bay. The CVD Facility will have a support area consisting of a control room, change rooms, and other functions required to support operations

[en] This document describes the baseline single-shell tank (SST) waste retrieval sequence for the River Protection Project (RPP) updated for Fiscal Year 2000. The SST retrieval sequence identifies the proposed retrieval order (sequence), the tank selection and prioritization rationale, and planned retrieval dates for Hanford SSTs. In addition, the tank selection criteria and reference retrieval method for this sequence are discussed

[en] In 1990, the Secretary of Energy (Secretary Watkins) ordered that all 23 of the Department's major organizations adopt systems of strategic planning. This paper explains the strategic planning process being adopted by one of those organizations, the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). Secretary Watkins also ordered a much-abbreviated planning cycle for 1990 to produce the first set of plans in September. That first plan for OCRWM is also discussed here

[en] Options for drafting by-laws are presented for consideration by low-level radioactive waste management compact commissions. The report includes an explanation of the various provisions that compact commission by-laws may include as well as examples of possible by-law language. The major sections of the report treat issues ranging from policy and powers, membership and staffing, to commission finances and liabilities. The appendixes present three examples of completed by-laws for existing organizations

[en] The purpose of Process Validation is to confirm that nominal process operations are consistent with the expected process envelope. The Process Validation activities described in this document are not part of the safety basis, but are expected to demonstrate that the process operates well within the safety basis. Some adjustments to the process may be made as a result of information gathered in Process Validation

[en] This report is a study of existing compacts and their commissions. The observations and facts are presented as they might affect low-level radioactive waste compacts and commissions. The study describes three categories of commissions: advisory, technical, and operating. Significant conclusions are: low-level waste commissions will likely be advisory and technical and low-level waste commissions must begin operations with a strong consensus and guiding mandate from their parent states. The study includes description of decision-making methods, staffing options, controls of states and Congress, and accountability and monitoring of commissions. It also makes some general recommendations on initial formation, subsequent organization, and operation of a low-level waste disposal commission, based on several scholarly works and experience of existing interstate compacts and commissions