Results 1 - 10 of 1959
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[en] Interconnections can be an effective way to increase competition and improve market integration in concentrated wholesale electricity markets with limited number of participants. This paper examines the potential for interconnections and increasing market integration in the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM). We use a time-varying Kalman filter technique to assess the degree of market integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe including Great Britain (GB). The results indicate no market integration between SEM and other European markets except for Elspot and GB. We show that the current state of market integration between SEM and GB is just 17% indicating potential to improve market integration via increased interconnector capacity. The results indicate that liquidity of wholesale markets might be a crucial factor in the market integration process while our results remain inconclusive in determining whether increased trade of renewables can improve market integration. - Highlights: ► We assess the degree of market integration between SEM and other EU electricity markets. ► Our results indicate no market integration between SEM and other European markets except for Elspot and GB. ► We show that the current state of market integration between SEM and GB is just 17%.
[en] Deregulation of the electric power industry is changing the 'personality' of utilities and the way they operate in order to survive in a more competitive marketplace. This paper will identify and discuss key issues NAC International believes will arise as the electric power industry responds to deregulation and later how Knowledge Management is going to help in the deregulated paradigm. (author)
[en] A predominant theme in the current electric utility industry literature is that competitive forces have emerged and may become more prominent. The wholesale bulk power market is alreadly competitive, as non-utility energy service providers already have had a significant impact on that market; this trend was accelerated by the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Although competition at the retail level is much less pervasive, electric utility customers increasingly have greater choice in selecting energy services. These choices may include, depending on the customer, the ability to self-generate, switch fuels, move to a new location, or rely more heavily on demand-side management as a means of controlling electric energy use. This paper explores the subject of how demand-side management (DSM) programs, which are often developed by a utility to satisfy resource requirements as a part of its least-cost planning process, can affect the utility's ability to compete in the energy services marketplace. In this context, the term 'DSM' is used in this paper to refer to those demand-side services and programs which provide resources to the utility's system. Depending on one's perspective, DSM programs (so defined) can be viewed either as an enhancement to the competitive position of a utility by enabling it to provide its customers with a broader menu of energy services, simultaneously satisfying the objectives of the utility as well as those of the customers, or as a detractor to a utility's ability to compete. In the latter case, the concern is with respect to the potential for adverse rate impacts on customers who are not participants in DSM programs. The paper consists of an identification of the pros and cons of DSM as a competitive strategy, the tradeoff which can occur between the cost impacts and rate impacts of DSM, and an examination of alternative strategies for maximizing the utilization of DSM both as a resource and as a competitive strategy
[en] The European project was a promise for the peoples of Europe to take up together the technological, economic and scientific challenges that each nation could not face alone. Alas, the beautiful dream of European cooperation repeating the successes of Ariane or Airbus has crashed against the Europeanist bureaucracy and the impotent ideology of the European Treaties, which it zealously applies
[fr]Le projet europeen etait une promesse pour les peuples europeens de relever ensemble les defis technologiques, economiques et scientifiques que chaque nation ne pouvait affronter seule. Helas, le beau reve d'une cooperation europeenne reiterant les succes d'Ariane ou d'Airbus s'est ecrase contre la bureaucratie europeiste et l'ideologie impuissante des traites europeens qu'elle applique avec zele
[en] In 'Retail competition in electricity markets' (Energy Policy, 37(2), February 2009, Pages 377-386) it is argued by Defeuilly that the introduction of retail competition into electricity markets gave rise to great expectations that it failed to meet, and that this was primarily the fault of Austrian economic thinking. The main purpose of this note is to explain why both of these propositions are incorrect. A few further comments challenge his subsequent suggestion that the competitive process in electricity is so constrained by the limitations of consumer decision-making and electricity technology as to cast doubt on the policy of opening the retail market to competition
[en] This paper presents the history of the competition First Step to Nobel Prize in Physics organized by Poland, its development from a national workshop in 1991/92 to an international competition nowadays and its organization, as well as the results obtained by the participants.
[en] Highlights: • We study supply function competition in an extended game. • Intercepts of supply functions are used as strategic variables. • Best replies slope down (up) if the slope of supplies is sufficiently low (high). • Simultaneous (sequential) play is selected if best replies are decreasing (increasing). • The mixed strategy equilibrium is also characterised. - Abstract: Multiplicity of equilibria under supply function competition is a two-layer problem. To prove it, we investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the subgame perfect equilibrium when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. When best replies are increasing, the mixed strategy solution cannot be circumvented. This makes the design of procurement more challenging than we were used to think.
[en] This paper investigates strategic capacity choices in electricity markets comprised of heterogeneous firms. Long term strategic investments are analyzed assuming that the wholesale market is competitive. There are two technologies available to produce electricity; both are efficient and used at a first best optimum. When not all firms can invest in both technologies, there can be over investment in either of these technologies. It is shown that if the number of firms that can invest in a particular technology is limited, the development of competition solely using the other technology can decrease welfare. (author)
[en] The new world oil market is distinguished by the level of uncertainty that surrounds trends in the price of crude oil. Although its influence has been diminished, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) remains a key player in this market and it is of interest to try to understand its current behaviour. A review is presented of OPEC market regulation, divergence and convergence around pricing issues, and OPEC's reactions to uncertainty, financing of additional production capacity and external competition, non-OPEC oil, alternative energy sources, and energy conservation. In the long term, OPEC has to choose, with the explicit and implicit accord of its other partners in the oil industry, between a relatively regulated market and a situation of total competition. There is the strong likelihood that in the future OPEC will not accept the role of unique regulator of the market and therefore of residual supplier when supply exceeds demand. 15 refs., 3 figs