Results 1 - 10 of 1025
Results 1 - 10 of 1025. Search took: 0.019 seconds
|Sort by: date | relevance|
[en] The judgment by the Tokyo District Court in the TEPCO criminal case that says 'rationale for the existence of long-term evaluation on large tsunami is not sufficient' is a complete mistake. The long-term evaluation was compiled in July 2002 as the warning that a big tsunami will come based on scientific grounds, and criticism suddenly increased just before its publication. There are many things to talk about on the secret conference just before the 3.11 tsunami (2011) and the intervention of TEPCO. This paper overlooks a secret meeting called 'information exchange meeting' which was held between TEPCO, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Japan Atomic Power Co., and Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (Secretariat) on March 3, 2011, just before the tsunami, and on how the long-term evaluation was attempted to change as a result. How was the long-term evaluation plan rewritten? At the 175th Long-Term Evaluation Subcommittee (February 1, 2012), the Earthquake Headquarters Secretariat prepared 'About the information exchange meeting regarding the revision of the long-term evaluation that was held between the Earthquake Headquarters Secretariat and TEPCO on March 3, 2011)' as a non-public document and explained. Later, in order to submit the contents of this document to the public discussion, the author summarized as a co-author, 'The background and problems of the information exchange meeting on March 3, 2011 on the long-term evaluation of the Japan Trench by the Earthquake Headquarters Secretariat and electric power companies.' (A.O.)
[en] In the criminal case, where three former TEPCO management persons were accused, the judgment of the Tokyo District Court mentioned on the long-term tsunami evaluation of the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion as follows: At the time before the Great Earthquake, the view of this long-term tsunami evaluation was not generally accepted as it should be adopted when considering disaster prevention measures including safety measures for nuclear reactors, as other electric power companies did not adopt the recommendation as it was. This judgment is full of question because there was factual err such as inconsistency with the facts clarified in the trial. This paper mainly describes three problems as follows; (1) the judge denied that TEPCO once approved the tsunami countermeasures based on long-term evaluation, (2) the judge doubted the reliability of the long-term evaluation, and (3) the judge did not recognize that tsunami measures had been prolonged by such measures as laying groundwork, hiding data, or putting pressure on other companies. (A.O.)
[en] We have investigated the issue of the nuclear power plant injunction trial. The court may have argued against the 'passed examination' conclusion accepted by the NRA. Many lawsuits have been filed to stop the operation of nuclear power plants. Judgments in court show various decisions. In this study group, we aim to clarify what technical issues are and to show positive theories about technical issues that have not been explained in court. In this presentation general outline of the structure and issues will be reported. (author)
[en] For the construction of Hinkley Point C and D, EdF demanded state subsidies from the British government in 2013 because otherwise it would not be economically viable. The EU approved certain measures as aid to promote the project. The Republic of Austria appealed against this decision, which was, however, rejected by the European Court (EC). Austria has appealed against this decision to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
[de]Fuer den Bau von Hinkley Point C und D forderte EdF 2013 von der britischen Regierung staatliche Subventionen, weil es sonst wirtschaftlich nicht rentabel sei. Zur staatlichen Foerderung des Projekts wurden von der EU bestimmte Massnahmen als Beihilfe genehmigt. Die Republik Oesterreich klagten gegen diesen Bescheid, die jedoch vom Europaeischen Gericht (EuG) abgewiesen wurden. Oesterreich hat gegen dieses Urteil Rechtsmittel zum EuGH eingelegt.
[en] This document is the mail sent by an association to the public prosecutor to bring a complaint against the CEA for several infringements related to the law on basic nuclear installations in its establishment of Cadarache, and more particularly in its STD installation which is used for the processing and packaging of solid wastes. This letter presents the role of the association and the concerned installation, describes an incident which occurred in October 2017 (fall of a parcel of radioactive wastes), and indicates the various alleged offences with respect to different articles of the Code of the Environment, of the Penal Code. Some documents are joined: an incident declaration by the ASN, a press article, and a decision of the ASN chairman
[en] This article summarises Japan's legal framework concerning access to the courts as well as recent court decisions concerning the operation of nuclear reactors. In Japan, only individuals have standing to sue; organisations and groups cannot establish standing. In practice, however, the court tends to admit standing for individuals more flexibly than before and a wide range of people are involved in actions concerning nuclear reactors. In addition, actions for one nuclear reactor can be filed multiple times without any time limit. These overall features ensure access to the courts for ordinary citizens. The Ikata Supreme Court decision established the framework for administrative cases where a licensing decision for the construction of a nuclear installation is disputed. The judgment, to some extent, respects the scientific and technical decisions of the regulatory authority, the administrative agency with extensive scientific and technological expertise, but tries to exercise some legal control by focusing on the regulatory standards and decision-making process. There is not yet a Supreme Court decision outlining the framework for civil cases. Some lower court decisions followed the Ikata Supreme Court decision while others did not. In all decisions, however, the NRA's licensing decisions were no longer easily accepted by the court in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. As mentioned above, the Ikata Supreme Court decision respects the expert decisions of the regulatory authority, but the experience of the severe accident has undermined confidence in the regulatory authority, which may affect judges' attitudes towards the NRA's safety review. The judicial review standards of the Ikata Supreme Court decision will continue to be applicable only if public confidence in the regulatory authority's expert decisions is maintained in our society. As suggested by some recent court decisions, new safety targets and regulatory standards set by the NRA, as well as its restart review process, should help it regain the confidence of our society. Although public participation and information disclosure have not been regarded as major legal issues in construction licensing, these aspects should now attract more concern in the Japanese legal framework. This article focuses on two issues: (1) how all citizens are ensured access to the courts and (2) how judges, who are legal rather than technical experts, review the licensing decisions or safety of nuclear reactors, a subject that requires a deep understanding of nuclear technology. Section II provides an overview of the regulations for the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, which is necessary to understand the court decisions. Section III summarises the legal framework concerning access to the courts in both administrative and civil cases. Sections IV and V describe the standards of judicial review applied to licensing decisions and safety of nuclear reactors. Although the Supreme Court established its standards of judicial review in administrative cases, it has not yet handed down any important decision in a civil case. Accordingly, lower court decisions are split in civil cases: some courts follow the approach in administrative cases, while others do not, particularly after the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. Section IV first describes the Supreme Court's standards of review for administrative cases and then Section V shows the different approaches in civil cases