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[en] The purpose of the following remarks is to explain the Agency's role in the international supply of source material and special fissionable material, and the procedures followed, by the Agency in supplying such material. In conclusion, some recent liberalization in the transfer of nuclear materials through the Agency is described.
[en] This paper explains the key activities that International Nuclear Services undertakes to consistently deliver high quality and reliable international marine transports of Category I to III nuclear materials. (author)
[en] Attribute measurement systems (AMS) are designed to measure potentially sensitive items containing Special Nuclear Materials to determine if the items possess attributes which fall within an agreed-upon range. Such systems could be used in a treaty to inspect and verify the identity of items in storage without revealing any sensitive information associated with the item. An AMS needs to satisfy two constraints: the host party needs to be sure that none of their sensitive information is released, while the inspecting party wants to have confidence that the limited amount of information they see accurately reflects the properties of the item being measured. The former involves 'certifying' the system and the latter 'authenticating' it. Previous work into designing and building AMS systems have focused more on the questions of certifiability than on the questions of authentication - although a few approaches have been investigated. The next step is to build a 3rd generation AMS which (1) makes the appropriate measurements, (2) can be certified, and (3) can be authenticated (the three generations). This paper will discuss the ideas, options, and process of producing a design for a 3rd generation AMS.
[en] This paper, which is limited to essentially dry solid systems where the majority of fissionable material has already been removed, discusses the bases for and features of a graded approach criticality safety program in which criticality can be documented not to be credible under all normal and all credible abnormal conditions. (authors)
[en] In accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Control Act and the Regulations made thereunder, the Atomic Energy Control Board established a licensing system governing all dealings in nuclear materials including production, export, import, acquisition, shipment and use in the interest of health, safety and security. In establishing its licensing system, the Board endeavoured to ensure that its requirements for records and reports on all dealings in nuclear materials were both consistent and uniformly applied. With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on March 5, 1970, the need for uniformity of the accountability records and reports prepared by Canadian licensees became even more important since these documents are subject to verification by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the terms of a safeguards agreement concluded between Canada and the Agency on February 29, 1972. The instruction set forth below for accountability records and reports on nuclear materials are intended to fulfill Canada's obligations under the NPT as well as the requirements of the Atomic Energy Control Act and Regulations. They have been prepared with a view to minimizing the effort required of licensees and to be compatible with electronic data processing. It should be noted that the information to be made available to IAEA inspectors will be limited to accountability data required for safeguards purposes. Information of a proprietary nature or involving questions of health and safety are not required to be made available to the IAEA under the terms of the safeguards agreement
[en] This article has been retracted: please see Elsevier Policy on Article Withdrawal ( (http://www.elsevier.com/locate/withdrawalpolicy)). This article has been retracted at the request of the Publisher. This document was mistakenly published instead of the editorial of this special issue. The correct editorial is published in J. Nucl. Mater., 419 (2011) 398, (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnucmat.2011.11.033). Apologies are offered to the guest editors and to readers of the Journal that this error was not detected during the production process.