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[en] Capturing knowledge from the beginning of a project is essential. Keeping this knowledge available, up-to-date, and maintaining it for the benefit of the next generations of workers that will operate facilities is no less critical. This presentation details the French experience in the area of knowledge management throughout the lifecycle of a nuclear project. (author)
[en] The protection of French nuclear sites is based on complementary responsibilities between the State and the plant operators. The State defines the threat and the protection objectives, and provides information and response in addition to the operator’s obligations. The operator has an obligation of results over its holdings with regard to on the design basis threat -DBT provided by the State, in addition to its regulatory obligations. Hence, Electricité de France (EDF) must protect the 58 units of its nuclear fleet on French soil. To carry out its responsibilities, EDF has chosen an original model that is based on material means of physical protection as well as on human resources, with some members of staff serving under private contract but with EDF status (site security), and others put in place through an agreement with a sovereign force of the Ministry of the Interior, financed by EDF. Those units are called PSPGs (Pelotons Spécialisés de Protection de la Gendarmerie – Gendarmerie Specialist Protection Platoons), and they are counter-terrorist units formed by the GIGN (National Gendarmerie Intervention Group). Their mission is to act on the operator’s behalf against the highest levels of threat. Their sovereign nature means that the units are also the first level of the State’s co-ordinated response; the gendarmerie is also present as a territorial police force that provides regional and national specialintervention forces. The attractiveness and relevance of this model that allows for good link-up between the operator’s means and the State’s means have been highlighted by inspections and realistic drill scenarios going back several years. Reference standards on threats are regularly updated by the State, and leads EDF to periodically review and improve its arrangements for protecting nuclear installations. The model developed by EDF complies with IAEA guidance, especially as regards the fundamental principles of in-depth defence, a security culture, and a graduated approach. (author)
[en] The CBRN terrorist threat is of major concern for numerous states. With this threat in mind, France created in 1995 the Inter-ministerial Central Detachment for Technical Intervention (Détache- ment Central Interministériel d’Intervention Technique or DCIIT): a dedicated structure to support the authority in charge of the crisis. The DCIIT comprises people from Homeland Security Minister (police squad, scientific police, and civilian defense), Defence Minister (Explosive Ordinance Disposal teams), Health Minister and French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux énergies alternatives or CEA). The composition of teams and the organization of the DCIIT are described. General tasks of DCIIT and its operation in the context of the fight against terrorism and potential CBRN malicious acts are described. In particular, when the French authorities have to organize a major public event, the DCIIT implements a special survey in the CBRN fields. The military division of CEA (a historical DCIIT partner) is in charge of the radiological/nuclear (RN) fields in terms of definition of technical equipment, operational teams deployed, research, and expertise. For example, DCIIT and CEA are involved in radiological and nuclear security of major public events and are systematically put in place during sensitive or large-scale events, such as the G8 and G20 Summits, the Anniversary Ceremonies related to D-Day and the Liberation of France, the visit of the Pope, the NATO Summit, and the Rugby World Cup. More recently in 2015, the DCIIT was in charge of the RN security of the Climate Conference (COP 21), and in 2016 they have been engaged for the European football cup. There are various tasks for the RN security of a major public event: · Before the event, conduct a radiological survey on a large area with a helicopter · Participate in inspections; check any radiological anomalies and radiological contamination at some sensitive points · Check with a search vehicle any radiological anomalies on the VIP itinerary or around the sensitive places · Set up radiological monitoring detection and identification at strategic locations · Provide a constant operative monitoring · Be ready to intervene We will present the organization of the DCIIT and the general missions before focusing on the strategy of RN security during major events based on more than 15 years of experience and enriched by technical developments resulting from CEA research programs. We will focus on the major events of 2015 and 2016. We will conclude with a discussion of characteristic events identified during French major public events. (author)
[en] This contribution briefly describes three research activities related to SNF performed by Orano TN, in France, with the general objective of investigating basic fuel behaviour properties in dry storage systems and gathering data on dry storage environment and cask materials in order to evaluate long term behaviour of cask materials.
[en] Results: The analysis of the contents of physics books for 17-18 year-olds shows a wide variety of subjects. • In France, less and less themes appear in current books when compared with books from the past (1980, 2002, 2006, 2012). • Few books in Europe seems to deal with essential aspects allowing students to have a good understanding on radioactivity and industrial or medical nuclear applications • Few basic Knowledge to understand what happen in case of accidents and to deconstruct irrational views and fears. • The best books: Hellemans Jacky et al, Quark, De Boeck, 2014, Belgium and Kornas Grzegorz, Fysika Operon, 2015, Poland. In countries where nuclear plants are built or will be built, the Physics curricula need to provide well-developed education programs, containing the basic knowledge on ionizing radiation, nuclear phenomenon, details about installations and IR applications, benefits and risks, as well as societal aspects.
[en] Full text: Background: Nuclear materials have to be secured while in facilities and during transports. It is a truism. That is why the CPPNM has been made and amended to fit with current threats. That is also the reason why IAEA is developing a set of NSS documents to help countries build, improve and implement their national nuclear security regime. The French nuclear security authority has emphasized the need to increase unpredictability on nuclear transports and developed a new concept. Unpredictability strengthens security Many constraints make difficult to conceal the occurrence of nuclear transports. On the one hand, safety is to be guarantied and has to be made transparent to most of public opinions : - Nuclear facilities are easily identified and steadily located, - dedicated roads, rail tracks, harbours and airports are scarce and generally shared with public freight and passengers. - logistic organisation calls for reproducing the same transport scenarii schedules. On the other hand, it is easily understood that security requires limited publicity and restrictions to keep days, hours, locations and length of stops, border crossing spots and itineraries of nuclear transports unknown. That is the reason why France calls for enhanced unpredictability as a way to guarantee and strengthen security, Unpredictability criteria at different stages of the transport To do so, France has selected of the following criteria to work on in order to foster unpredictability and to deceive potential malicious’ actions : - itineraries, - night stops, - temporary resting areas - days of departure / arrival, - hours of departure and arrival, In 2016, the Department for nuclear security of the ministry of energy emphasizes the need for regular changes. That close scrutiny applies to : · far advance logistic planning (for the carrier to organise) · the nuclear security authority analysing the carrier’s transport request, · transport security permanent surveillance while in process, · annual statistics and controls on main NM transports flows The nuclear security authority proposes to elaborate on the lessons learned from the effective implementation of this method. (author)
[en] With a number of next-step fusion devices currently being implemented - such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in Cadarache, France, and the Wendelstein 7-X stellarator in Greifswald, Germany - and in view of the concomitant need to demonstrate the technological feasibility of fusion power plants as well as the economic viability of this method of energy production, the fusion community is now facing new challenges. The way these challenges are addressed will dictate research orientations in the present and coming decades. The scientific scope of FEC 2018 was, therefore, intended to reflect the priorities of this new era in fusion energy research. The conference aimed to serve as a platform for sharing the results of research and development efforts in both national and international fusion experiments that have been shaped by these new priorities, and to thereby help in pinpointing worldwide advances in fusion theory, experiments, technology, engineering, safety and socio-economics. Furthermore, the conference also set these results against the backdrop of the requirements for a net energy producing fusion device and a fusion power plant in general, and will thus help in defining the way forward.
[en] Full text: The presentation will focus on table top exercises which create an easy forum to merge safety and security issues and to allow training and open discussions between stakeholders on key points. The general statements and remarks resulting from the French experience in nuclear security exercises will be shared and detailed in 4 main topics : 1 the decision making process, 2 the coordination and interfaces, 3 the planning, preparation and training, 4 the time and people management. (author)
[en] The first generation of operators started up the facilities and optimized their operation. This first phase gave them a better understanding of operations and related limits, particularly through testing and start-up operations and the responses that had to be found for all of the technical issues that arose. All of these interactions offered opportunities to make the safety challenges of processes and facilities tangible and directly perceptible. The young operators of those bygone years are now the ones who are “in the know” in the organizations, the ones with unique technical know-how and a multi-layered perception of the risks involved. Those first generations of operators, with their unique operational knowledge and know-how, are gradually leaving the industrial world. Replacing those skills creates a new set of challenges. The first part of the article presents specific training measures, qualification programs and organizations to ensure that all of these developments are under proper control. Concomitantly, the French nuclear safety authority also benefitted from these facility start-ups to increase its skills by sharing in the learning process concerning the facilities’ operational realities and in the construction of a safety configuration program, and by gaining a concrete perception of risk. This fostered the mutual trust that is vital and integral to facility safety. The setting for this work is characterized by a proliferation of regulatory requirements, even though the facilities themselves have integrated in their process some benefits from continuous safety improvement. Whereas previously safety resulted from a weighted balance between managed safety and regulated safety, we are seeing regulated safety assume an increasingly dominant role. The sharp upward trend of regulatory requirements in France makes one wonder about their real impacts in terms of continuous safety improvement. The second part of the article questions (a) the efficiency of the overall process of safety governance and (b) the different biases and pitfalls that safety faces. A link with generational renewal is made trying to explain a part of the causality. (author)