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[en] The UAE was the first Newcomer country to start building a large nuclear power plant in three decades: The Nuclear Construction of four units of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant started simultaneously in 2012 - Sets a role model globally by achieving in a record time requirements needed to ensure its nuclear infrastructure was capable to support the programme through the highest levels on nuclear safety, security and non proliferation; The FANR issued also regulations for onsite as well as offsite nuclear emergency preparedness and response, and the combined onsite and offsite arrangements were put in place. EPREV including the follow up done; The country builds its national capacity for a sustainable operation simultaneously. Simulators in FANR and at site. Online monitoring of plant parameters are available at FANR as well as laboratories and monitoring systems; Highly experienced regulatory experts support the program in headquarter in Abu Dhabi and at site office in Barakah. Steps taken by FANR - Initial phase: The creation of the necessary skills and legally binding requirements for the safe siting, construction and design of the reactors to be built as well as for the needed security and non-proliferation arrangements; Evaluation: FANR evaluated the project based on a two step process, first construction license and then the operating license. This included further innovative design enhancements to address extreme conditions related to severe phenomena inside and outside the reactors. Systematic documentation and knowledge management built at FANR; Enhancement: Environmental effects on the reactors, as well as additional cooling and power supply measures enhanced. UAE specific factors and Fukushima impact. Making the most of synergy: The government signed international agreements & conventions supporting the programme developments; The agreements with the country of origin regulatory bodies which allowed FANR to leverage the work of the Korean regulators to license the reference plant in Korea, the Shin Kori 3 and 4 reactors; Support of the IAEA was instrumental in ensuring that the FANR approach to regulation kept with the best international practices; A pool of international experienced experts work hand in hand with local staff to develop regulations, conduct assessments and do inspections. Also the competence based framework for training and mentoring is essential for sustainability of FANR as a recognized nuclear regulator worldwide; FANR has over 30 agreements with international organizations & other regulatory bodies to exchange technical knowledge & build national capacity.
[en] This new edition of the Nuclear Law Bulletin Index covers the first 103 issues of the Nuclear Law Bulletin (NLB). By established practice, the plan of the Index is not a replica of the Bulletin, as it was considered more useful for research purposes to group together all the information concerning legislative and regulatory activities, case law and bilateral agreements and to classify this information by country. Following classification by country, references to the work of international organisations, multilateral agreements, studies and articles are set out in separate sections. The 'Bibliography and News Briefs' section is omitted from the Index. A separate chapter of the Index has been devoted to the listing of the instruments published in the Supplements to the Bulletin, or in the Chapter 'Texts' from past Bulletins, up until the present date. Each item in the Index is followed by a reference to the relevant Bulletin. Legislative and regulatory texts, as well as agreements reproduced in the Bulletins or their Supplements, are also referenced
[en] At the start of 2020, twenty months after the US 'withdrawal', the Iranian nuclear deal is still alive. Since May 2018, the course of things has not been what Washington hoped for. The United States has overestimated its ability to impose its will on the two targets of this 'withdrawal' - Iran and the Europeans (E3 / EU). Neither Iran nor the Europeans have given in. The first has shown its resilience and, even more, a remarkable ability to manage the crisis triggered by Donald Trump. Europeans, willingly cataloged as incapable, had a central role in this dossier, in 2018 and 2019. In less than 2 years, the dossier has been profoundly transformed. There was still, in 2015, essentially a nuclear proliferation issue. It has since been greatly enriched and now intersects with several other major international security issues: transatlantic tensions, the Gulf and Middle East conflicts, the evolution of the distribution of power between the major international players and that of the system. Collective security. This does not facilitate the appearance of a solution and makes the effort complex to identify its prospects for development complex. Article published in 'Paix et Securite Europeenne et Internationale' - PSEI, no. 14. Full text available online at: http://revel.unice.fr/psei/index.html?id=2180
[fr]Debut 2020, vingt mois apres le 'retrait' americain, l'accord nucleaire iranien est encore en vie. Depuis mai 2018, le cours des choses n'a pas ete celui qu'esperait Washington. Les Etats-Unis ont surestime leur capacite d'imposer leur volonte aux deux cibles de ce 'retrait' - l'Iran et les Europeens (E3 /UE). Ni l'Iran, ni les Europeens n'ont cede. Le premier a montre sa resilience et, plus encore, une remarquable capacite a gerer la crise declenchee par Donald Trump. Les Europeens, volontiers catalogues comme incapables, ont eu dans ce dossier tout au contraire un role central, en 2018 et en 2019. En moins de 2 ans, le dossier s'est profondement transforme. Il etait encore, en 2015, essentiellement un dossier de proliferation nucleaire. Il s'est depuis fortement enrichi et recoupe desormais plusieurs autres grands dossiers de securite internationale: les tensions transatlantiques, les conflits du Golfe et du Moyen-Orient, l'evolution de la repartition de la puissance entre les grands acteurs internationaux et celle du systeme de securite collective. Cela ne facilite pas l'apparition d'une solution et rend complexe l'effort pour degager ses perspectives d'evolution. Article publie dans 'Paix et Securite Europeenne et Internationale' - PSEI, no. 14. Texte integral disponible a: http://revel.unice.fr/psei/index.html?id=2180
[en] This report complies with the formal reporting obligations of the Director General ASNO. It provides an overview of ASNO’s role and performance in supporting nuclear safeguards and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It summarizes current local and global major issues and the functional overview and performance of ASNO during 2019-2020.
[en] The obligation of used nuclear fuel (UNF) management lies with the NPP operator, and further – with the country which origins it. International Agreements like IAEA Joint Convention and the EU Directive 2011/70/Euratom all state that final wastes should be disposed of in the country where it is generated. Therefore, the ultimate responsibility for the management of radioactive waste (RW) lies with each member country. In many cases for the sole country and especially the sole NPP operator it is not easy to keep that responsibility: for example, for countries with small nuclear programmes it will be difficult to have enough resources available for managing spent fuel and radioactive wastes. In certain circumstances, safe and efficient management of UNF and RW might be fostered through agreement among countries to use facilities in one of them for the benefit of the others. Another potential approach to be considered is to put responsibility for UNF disposal on the fuel supplier in the model of fuel leasing. The ability to transfer responsibility for all the fuel issues including supply of the fresh one and treatment of the irradiated one is a long-standing desire of the most NPP operators1, since the main task for the operator is safe and economically effective electricity production. And other tasks seem to be forced or indirect. But this desire can be hardly realized for some reasons. One of them is RW return issue: desired leasing scheme does not include the return of any RW after UNF reprocessing to the country where this UNF is generated, which, as a rule, is unacceptable for political reasons. History knows cases when, despite to the above restrictions, the nuclear fuel leasing was implemented (for example take-back service between the USSR and Eastern Europe countries, when the used fuel of power reactors came back to USSR from GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria etc). However, these cases are the exception rather than the rule. At the same time, the leasing concept has a number of undeniable advantages, the most important of which is the focus on the service nature in the cooperation between the supplier and the customer. The report describes how the service principle may be implemented to the fuel supply and UNF management, taking into account the current capabilities and limitations. It is important to note that the paper does not propose any new technical solutions and inventions, but concentrates on the model that could integrate currently existing and developing solutions to be attractive to the UNF owner. (author)
[en] A Joe Biden administration would likely make an early diplomatic push to ease tensions with Iran. Biden has said he favors the United States rejoining the nuclear deal if Iran also returns to full compliance. In that case, Tehran demands reliable sanctions relief and compensation for the economic fall-out of U.S. sanctions. During the U.S. transition, Europe would need to shift quickly from trying to save the nuclear deal to forging a new transatlantic approach to Tehran, helping kickstart U.S.- Iranian negotiations. To immediately de-escalate tensions, Iran and the United States could pursue a phased approach, pushing more complex issues to a later date.
[en] The aim of the present paper is to provide a short analysis regarding the practice concerning the application of the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (Århus Convention) in relation to the use of nuclear energy. By referring to the individual cases, the question of a balance between the right of the public to participate in environmental matters on the one hand and the interest of maintaining the safety of nuclear installations on the other is being discussed. Specifically, it is an illustration of two sequential cases of alleged violations of the Århus Convention in the context of construction of the Mochovce 3 and 4 reactor units. (author)
[en] Conclusion: • The nuclear power cogeneration from existing NPPs through the use of NPP-HPS technology allows to achieve the following results: - reduce from 2 to 4 times the consumption of fossil fuels in the energy systems, with a corresponding reduction in CO2 emissions; - twofold increase in the share of existing NPPs in the global energy balance due to the large-scale production of heat for district heating, distillation desalination plants and greenhouses; - increase in revenues, reduction of payback period, reduction of losses of circulating water, reduction of thermal and humidity impact on the environment from existing NPPs; - increase in cash receipts due to reduced CO2 emissions. • Thus, a new direction of increasing the energy, economic and environmental efficiency of existing and new NPPs, which is fully consistent with International Agreements in the field of climate change mitigation.
[en] The transport of radioactive materials is regulated worldwide by an extensive, multifaceted and complex system of international conventions, guidelines and recommendations. However, they represent binding national law only to the extent that they have been implemented - in whole or in part - into national law. The legal system covers all types of radioactive materials and modes of transport with the aim of effectively protecting persons, material goods and the environment from the risks associated with transport.
[de]Die Beförderung radioaktiver Stoffe wird weltweit durch ein umfangreiches, vielschichtiges und komplexes System internationaler Übereinkommen, Richtlinien und Empfehlungen geregelt. Sie repräsentieren innerstaatlich bindendes Recht jedoch nur insoweit, sofern sie - ganz oder teilweise - in national geltendes Recht umgesetzt worden sind. Das Rechtssystem erstreckt sich auf alle Arten radioaktiver Stoffe und Verkehrsträger mit der Zielsetzung, Personen, Sachgüter und die Umwelt vor den mit der Beförderung einhergehenden Gefahren wirksam zu schützen.