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[en] Full text: The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Research and Training framework programmes are benefitting from a consistent success in pursuing excellence in research and facilitating Pan-European collaborative efforts across a broad range of nuclear science and technologies, nuclear fission and radiation protection. To fulfil Euratom R&D programmes keys objectives of maintaining high levels of nuclear knowledge and building a more dynamic and competitive European industry, promotion of Pan-European mobility of researchers are implemented by co-financing transnational access to research infrastructures and joint research activities through to research and innovation and coordination and support actions funding schemes. Establishment by the research community of Europe and technology platforms are being capitalized. Mapping of research infrastructures and E&T capabilities is allowing a closer cooperation within the European Union and beyond, benefiting from multilateral international agreements and from closer cooperation between Euratom, OECD/NEA and IAEA and international fora. “Euratom success stories” in facilitating Pan-European E&T collaborative efforts through research and training framework programmes show the benefits of research efforts in key fields, of building an effective “critical mass”, of promoting the creation of “centres of excellence” with an increased support for “open access to key research infrastructures”, exploitation of research results, management of knowledge, dissemination and sharing of learning outcomes. (author)
[en] Until now, nuclear disarmament only occurred unilaterally (South-Africa, Iraq) or in a bilateral constellation between the U.S. and Russia within the START- and INF-process. Mainly, the reduction or destruction of the delivery systems has been verified by national technical means or inspections, not the dismantlement of nuclear warheads itself. Additionally, the IAEA, but also other verification agencies and institutions have gathered much procedural and technological expertise in verifying the presence or absence of nuclear materials for military purposes. Internationally, there are two main efforts to advance the nuclear disarmament process, which is blocked politically. The ''International Partnership for Disarmament Verification'' (IPNDV) is a 25 state endeavour inter alia to provide a strong analytic contribution to build the needed tool kit of nuclear disarmament concepts and capabilities. At the same time the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (not yet in Force) is established as the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons, with the goal of leading towards their total elimination. Art. 3/4 are advocating ''to remove and destroy nuclear weapons'' by ''verifiable, time-bound, transparent and irreversible destruction''. The talk articulates the results, experiences, principles and technologies of the international efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verifications and attempts to identify the criteria, common ground and gaps of the different approaches.
[en] The Argentine Republic signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 1986 and ratified its Amendment in 2011 (prior to its entry into force on May 8, 2016). As the CPPNM is the only legally binding international instrument in the area of physical protection, it is a key element of the international legal framework for nuclear security. During the last few years, nuclear security has become a very important concern at the international level and Argentina has demonstrated a strong commitment with this matter. Argentina has always highlighted the importance of IAEA’s role in order to strengthen global nuclear security and has supported the efforts made by the Agency in it. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) of Argentina was created by the Nuclear Activity National Act as an autonomous body reporting to the country’s Presidency, and is independent of any organization dedicated to the use or the promotion of nuclear energy in any of its forms. ARN has the final objective of protecting the people and the environment from the potential harm of ionizing radiations. With this goal it has federal competence to regulate the nuclear activity on specific areas: radiological safety, nuclear safety, safeguards and physical protection. As a regulator, ARN dictates regulatory standards, issues the permissions and licenses authorizing practices and installations, controls the compliance with standards, requirements and license conditions, enforces this compliance and has a leading role in the preparation and response to radiological and nuclear emergencies. In summary, regarding physical protection, ARN is the competent authority responsible for the implementation of the regulatory functions on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities and radioactive sources, and therefore has a key role in complying with the CPPNM and its Amendment. Specifically, ARN issued the “Standard of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities” establishing general criteria of physical protection of nuclear materials within nuclear facilities and during transport. It identifies levels of protection, the general features that a physical protection system should include and main aspects of its assessment. This standard, AR 10.13.1, had a first revision in 2002 and is under a broader process of general revision nowadays. The paper will analyze the current status of the Argentine physical protection standards (in terms of normative, requirements and license conditions) and the challenges that the Amendment poses to our national legislation since new offences were incorporated to Article 7 of the Convention. It will also elaborate on the specific role of ARN in the implementation of CPPNM and its Amendment. (authors)
[en] Concerning holders of small amount nuclear material mainly for non-nuclear purposes, the accounting system is not mandatory and even the license for using nuclear material is not necessary if he/she has amount less than specified in the law. In this paper, key issues that may induce difficulties in nuclear accounting and bring confusion to holders of nuclear material for non-nuclear use are presented and effective ways to improve the present state system are suggested. The role of state is essential for the IAEA to complete its safeguards mission, and well-defined legal structure is prerequisite for effective control of nuclear material. The current accounting system for nonnuclear purpose nuclear material has some difficulties in tracking without missing. When the loss of nuclear material happens and the reason cannot be identified, it could be a negative impact on a state’s nuclear transparency even if the amount is small. To minimize this kind of risk, it is necessary to amend laws and improve implementing system.
[en] The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) is the national governmental organization in charge of the regulation of nuclear activities in Argentina, and is independent of any entity dedicated to the use or the promotion of nuclear energy in any of its forms. ARN was created in 1997 by the National Nuclear Activity Act (Law No. 24.804), which established its mission and responsibilities. This autarchic entity within the jurisdiction of the Argentine Presidency has competence on radiological and nuclear safety, physical protection, safeguards and nuclear nonproliferation. As the authority responsible for safeguards implementation, the ARN attaches great importance to assuring efficient and effective safeguards through robust capabilities of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) and a strong connection with external relevant institutions. To fulfill its mission, ARN is committed to continuously develop its own human capacity and outreach to licensees and relevant stakeholders, assuring a clear understanding of safeguards obligations and responsibilities. From an international perspective, ARN maintains interactions with several organizations through mechanisms such as the Cooperation Protocol with the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; the Agreement with the United States Department of Energy concerning research and development in nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards application; and the Argentine Support Programme to the International Atomic Energy Agency. These partnerships foster collaboration in safeguards implementation through tailored training and activities on safeguards approaches, measurement techniques, containment and surveillance, the conduct of domestic/regional inspections and the role of a SSAC in implementing international safeguards, among others. The paper focuses on ARN’s interfaces in safeguards capacity-building activities conducted during the past four years. It describes the experience gained through in-house training, facility operator engagement and collaborative actions within the above mentioned frameworks, while sharing the lessons learned. (authors)
[en] Highlights: • Most BWM occur along shipping routes and tend to be denser at high latitudes. • Vessel arrivals to the United States have stayed relatively constant from 2005 to 2017. • Total ballast water discharge in the United States has grown from 2005 to 2017. • Total ballast discharge in the United States is dominated by bulkers and tankers. • Alternative BWM comprises an increasing proportion of total BWM from 2014 to 2016. - Abstract: Maritime shipping transports over 90% of global goods. Ballast water, used to provide vessel stability, has been associated with the introduction of marine invasive species. Thus, understanding ballasting trends is imperative to protecting human and environmental health. This paper examines data from the National Ballast Information Clearinghouse to assess ballasting behavior and shipping trends in the United States. From 2005 to 2017, vessel arrivals have remained relatively constant (annual growth rate of 1.2% per year) while total ballast discharge per vessel has grown at an annual rate of 7.6%. Furthermore, from 2014 to 2016, alternative ballast water management methods have been on the rise, and these treatment options are likely to continue increasing in response to the International Maritime Organization Ballast Water Management Convention that entered into force in September 2017. It is critical that the shipping industry monitors potential cascading impacts on other ballasting behaviors stemming from this shift.
[en] The United Kingdom (UK), in March 2017, notified the withdrawal from the European Union (EU), then initiated the countdown for the actual BREXIT in 2019. Since EURATOM is managed by the same organisation of EU although those are different legal entities, the withdrawal from EURATOM is considered to be unavoidable. Therefore, UK has to define the regulation for the measures covered by EURATOM which include the implementing safeguards in the civil UK nuclear facilities and the nuclear cooperation agreements between EURATOM and third nations. UK experts recognise that such re-arrangements within 2-years are very tough hurdle, so that some alternative measures are proposed by industry side. For peaceful nuclear use in Japan, hindrances on the smooth transfers of nuclear materials and equipment between UK are concerned. This paper will discuss the UK withdrawal from EURATOM focussed on the UK's correspondence and the potential influence on cooperation with Japan in view of nuclear non-proliferation. (author)
[en] A recent shutdown of Kori nuclear power plant unit no. 1 illustrates uneasiness(Khalaquzzaman et al., 2010). The unit successfully passed the safety standards in a recent official inspection for an operation extension conducted by nuclear experts, but was compelled to shut down owing to strong opposition from the public. Since Korean citizens are actively expressing and spreading their opinions, the most important task for the Korean government and nuclear power plant operator has now become persuasion of the relevant stakeholders, i.e., residents of the candidate area, Korean citizens overall, and anti-nuclear NGOs, when establishing nuclearrelated facilities(Choi et al., 1998). While there have been many researches on the public acceptance of nuclear-related facilities, the existing literature has only utilized a variable-centric approach targeting the national public overall. Such approaches, however, are not appropriate for an in-depth investigation of a group of people in a specific region. This is fortunate for governments and the institutes in concern as expected difficulties may be resolved through appropriate policies. This research, based on the results and analysis presented in the previous sections, suggest the following four policy measures. Since the residents have long been experiencing the economic benefit of nuclear power plants, they are more likely to perceive the additional benefits from a hosting nuclear research institute. Secondly, governments should consider the placement of a nuclear research institute along with nuclear-related educational facilities and hospitals based on nuclear technologies (e.g., cancer treatment). This is because the two facilities are perceived as being more positive than research institutes, and the two facilities may have a positive economic impact on the region.
[en] Highlights: • Antarctica’s scientific and intrinsic values are worthy of protection. • Antarctic Treaty System bodies have and are taking action to protect these values. • Much Antarctic science is done that is relevant to environmental policy discussions. • Environmental benefits will result from greater science-policy interaction. • Mechanisms linking evidence and governance could be strengthened and better funded. - Abstract: The Antarctic has significant environmental, scientific, historic, and intrinsic values, all of which are worth protecting into the future. Nevertheless, the area is subject to an increasing level and diversity of human activities that may impact these values within marine, terrestrial and cryosphere environments. Threats to the Antarctic environment, and to the aforementioned values, include climate change, pollution, habitat destruction, wildlife disturbance and non-native species introductions. Over time, a suite of legally binding international agreements, which form part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), has been established to help safeguard the Antarctic environment and provide a framework for addressing the challenges arising from these threats. Foremost among these agreements are the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Many scientists working in Antarctica undertake research that is relevant to Antarctic environmental policy development. More effective two-way interaction between scientists and those responsible for policy development would further strengthen the governance framework, including by (a) better communication of policy makers’ priorities and identification of related science requirements and (b) better provision by scientists of ‘policy-ready’ information on existing priorities, emerging issues and scientific/technological advances relevant to environmental protection. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) has a long and successful record of summarizing policy-relevant scientific knowledge to policy makers, such as through its Group of Specialists on Environmental Affairs and Conservation (GOSEAC) up to 2002, currently the SCAR Standing Committee on the Antarctic Treaty System (SCATS) and recently through its involvement in the Antarctic Environments Portal. Improvements to science-policy communication mechanisms, combined with purposeful consideration of funding opportunities for policy-relevant science, would greatly enhance international policy development and protection of the Antarctic environment.