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[en] The aim of the present paper is to provide a short analysis regarding the practice concerning the application of the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (Århus Convention) in relation to the use of nuclear energy. By referring to the individual cases, the question of a balance between the right of the public to participate in environmental matters on the one hand and the interest of maintaining the safety of nuclear installations on the other is being discussed. Specifically, it is an illustration of two sequential cases of alleged violations of the Århus Convention in the context of construction of the Mochovce 3 and 4 reactor units. (author)
[en] The approval of the ―Bonn Call to Action‖ in December 2012 where 10 priority actions to be completed within 10 years, implied that countries and organizations national and international carry out various activities and coordination including the realization of international events to discuss the issue, highlighting the Ibero-American Conference on Radiological Protection in Medicine - CIPRAM that was held in October 2016 in Madrid with the objective to discuss the main problems, propose solutions and establish indicators to evaluate progress on proposed solutions. In August 2017 the Symposium was held Conference on Radiation Protection in Medicine in Arequipa, Peru to analyze the agreements with the active participation of professionals from regulatory bodies, Health, Professional Societies, universities, among others. It was appreciated that in various sectors In Latin America, international agreements are not known in detail and in others, it has not been possible to implement for various reasons. For this reason, the participants of the Arequipa Symposium decided create a commission to work on the issue, which later formed the Latin American Network in Radiological Protection in Medicine (LAPRAM Network) which is made up of professionals seeking strengthen radiological protection in the medical applications of ionizing radiation in the region by carrying out various actions, such as organizing work groups to propose solution to specific problems, promote and participate in the training of personnel in a face-to-face and virtual, establish relationships with national and international organizations to meet with the objectives of the Network, to disseminate the issues in congresses and technical events, to promote exchange of good experiences in the implementation of the agreements, monitor the progress of the actions carried out, improve communication and dissemination of radiological protection issues, among others. I know has the fanpage, www.facebook.com/redlapram as a means of dissemination. In this work present the main actions that have been carried out through the Internet.
[en] At the start of 2020, twenty months after the US 'withdrawal', the Iranian nuclear deal is still alive. Since May 2018, the course of things has not been what Washington hoped for. The United States has overestimated its ability to impose its will on the two targets of this 'withdrawal' - Iran and the Europeans (E3 / EU). Neither Iran nor the Europeans have given in. The first has shown its resilience and, even more, a remarkable ability to manage the crisis triggered by Donald Trump. Europeans, willingly cataloged as incapable, had a central role in this dossier, in 2018 and 2019. In less than 2 years, the dossier has been profoundly transformed. There was still, in 2015, essentially a nuclear proliferation issue. It has since been greatly enriched and now intersects with several other major international security issues: transatlantic tensions, the Gulf and Middle East conflicts, the evolution of the distribution of power between the major international players and that of the system. Collective security. This does not facilitate the appearance of a solution and makes the effort complex to identify its prospects for development complex. Article published in 'Paix et Securite Europeenne et Internationale' - PSEI, no. 14. Full text available online at: http://revel.unice.fr/psei/index.html?id=2180
[fr]Debut 2020, vingt mois apres le 'retrait' americain, l'accord nucleaire iranien est encore en vie. Depuis mai 2018, le cours des choses n'a pas ete celui qu'esperait Washington. Les Etats-Unis ont surestime leur capacite d'imposer leur volonte aux deux cibles de ce 'retrait' - l'Iran et les Europeens (E3 /UE). Ni l'Iran, ni les Europeens n'ont cede. Le premier a montre sa resilience et, plus encore, une remarquable capacite a gerer la crise declenchee par Donald Trump. Les Europeens, volontiers catalogues comme incapables, ont eu dans ce dossier tout au contraire un role central, en 2018 et en 2019. En moins de 2 ans, le dossier s'est profondement transforme. Il etait encore, en 2015, essentiellement un dossier de proliferation nucleaire. Il s'est depuis fortement enrichi et recoupe desormais plusieurs autres grands dossiers de securite internationale: les tensions transatlantiques, les conflits du Golfe et du Moyen-Orient, l'evolution de la repartition de la puissance entre les grands acteurs internationaux et celle du systeme de securite collective. Cela ne facilite pas l'apparition d'une solution et rend complexe l'effort pour degager ses perspectives d'evolution. Article publie dans 'Paix et Securite Europeenne et Internationale' - PSEI, no. 14. Texte integral disponible a: http://revel.unice.fr/psei/index.html?id=2180
[en] A Joe Biden administration would likely make an early diplomatic push to ease tensions with Iran. Biden has said he favors the United States rejoining the nuclear deal if Iran also returns to full compliance. In that case, Tehran demands reliable sanctions relief and compensation for the economic fall-out of U.S. sanctions. During the U.S. transition, Europe would need to shift quickly from trying to save the nuclear deal to forging a new transatlantic approach to Tehran, helping kickstart U.S.- Iranian negotiations. To immediately de-escalate tensions, Iran and the United States could pursue a phased approach, pushing more complex issues to a later date.
[en] Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, America and Russia have again returned to conflict. But this renewed confrontation did not come out of the blue. Rather, it was preceded by a long period of stagnation and a final crisis in the realm of arms control. In particular, the agreements of cooperative arms control in Europe eroded after the turn of the millennium. Why did that neatly established network of security agreements collapse? In this volume, Ulrich Kühn traces the rise and fall of cooperative arms control in Europe from the early Helsinki days to the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Applying a multi-theory approach in order to assess the foreign and security policies of the United States and Russia, the author not only answers who is to blame for the sorry state of arms control, but he also uncovers a regime complex that has so far remained unknown and that spans across various organisations and institutions.
[en] This report complies with the formal reporting obligations of the Director General ASNO. It provides an overview of ASNO’s role and performance in supporting nuclear safeguards and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It summarizes current local and global major issues and the functional overview and performance of ASNO during 2019-2020.
[en] Over the years (64 issues), this publication proposes articles which address the various aspects of non proliferation issues such as international negotiations, controls, actions, problems faced, crisis situations, and traffics related to the application of the NPT or other treaties and conventions related to the non proliferations of various weapons (nuclear, biological, chemical) and of vectors, as well as other issues such as education, international events, etc. Interviews are also proposed.
[en] Conclusion: • The nuclear power cogeneration from existing NPPs through the use of NPP-HPS technology allows to achieve the following results: - reduce from 2 to 4 times the consumption of fossil fuels in the energy systems, with a corresponding reduction in CO2 emissions; - twofold increase in the share of existing NPPs in the global energy balance due to the large-scale production of heat for district heating, distillation desalination plants and greenhouses; - increase in revenues, reduction of payback period, reduction of losses of circulating water, reduction of thermal and humidity impact on the environment from existing NPPs; - increase in cash receipts due to reduced CO2 emissions. • Thus, a new direction of increasing the energy, economic and environmental efficiency of existing and new NPPs, which is fully consistent with International Agreements in the field of climate change mitigation.
[en] The UAE was the first Newcomer country to start building a large nuclear power plant in three decades: The Nuclear Construction of four units of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant started simultaneously in 2012 - Sets a role model globally by achieving in a record time requirements needed to ensure its nuclear infrastructure was capable to support the programme through the highest levels on nuclear safety, security and non proliferation; The FANR issued also regulations for onsite as well as offsite nuclear emergency preparedness and response, and the combined onsite and offsite arrangements were put in place. EPREV including the follow up done; The country builds its national capacity for a sustainable operation simultaneously. Simulators in FANR and at site. Online monitoring of plant parameters are available at FANR as well as laboratories and monitoring systems; Highly experienced regulatory experts support the program in headquarter in Abu Dhabi and at site office in Barakah. Steps taken by FANR - Initial phase: The creation of the necessary skills and legally binding requirements for the safe siting, construction and design of the reactors to be built as well as for the needed security and non-proliferation arrangements; Evaluation: FANR evaluated the project based on a two step process, first construction license and then the operating license. This included further innovative design enhancements to address extreme conditions related to severe phenomena inside and outside the reactors. Systematic documentation and knowledge management built at FANR; Enhancement: Environmental effects on the reactors, as well as additional cooling and power supply measures enhanced. UAE specific factors and Fukushima impact. Making the most of synergy: The government signed international agreements & conventions supporting the programme developments; The agreements with the country of origin regulatory bodies which allowed FANR to leverage the work of the Korean regulators to license the reference plant in Korea, the Shin Kori 3 and 4 reactors; Support of the IAEA was instrumental in ensuring that the FANR approach to regulation kept with the best international practices; A pool of international experienced experts work hand in hand with local staff to develop regulations, conduct assessments and do inspections. Also the competence based framework for training and mentoring is essential for sustainability of FANR as a recognized nuclear regulator worldwide; FANR has over 30 agreements with international organizations & other regulatory bodies to exchange technical knowledge & build national capacity.