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[en] The following topics are discussed: Education concept (Educational system; Types of education and training; Education and training groups); Qualifications and competencies (Staff groups); Certifications, licences and authorisations; Educational and training facilities, training programmes; educational plans, education and training assessments, records. (P.A.)
[en] In Brazil, according to CNEN standard, a nuclear power plant has authorization to operate for 40 years. Angra 1 commercial operation started in 1985 and it has license to operate until 2024. Eletronuclear aims to extend the operation of the Angra 1 plant from 40 to 60 years. To obtain the license renewal by more than 20 years (long-term operation), Eletronuclear will need to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54, CNEN NT-CGRC-007/18 and NT-CGRC-008/18 (CNEN technical notes). To obtain a license renewal to a long-term operation it is necessary to demonstrate that the plants will operate according to safety requirements, through analysis, testing, aging management, system upgrades, as well as additional inspections. Plant operators and regulators must always ensure that plant safety is maintained and, when it is possible, strengthened during the long-term operation of the plant. One of the documents to obtain a license renewal to a long-term operation is the Quality Assurance Program (QAP). Angra 1 has a QAP according to 10CFR 50 App B and CNEN NN 1.16 for safety related items. However, according to 10 CFR50.34, NUREG-1800 Appendix A.2, NUREG-1801 Appendix A-1 of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and NT-CGRC-007/18 and NT-CGRC-008/18 of CNEN, the QAP needs to include the items that are not safety related but are included in the Aging Management. This article will discuss the Angra 1 QAP for the license renewal to a long-term operation according the standards approved by CNEN. (author)
[en] The in-service inspection program of the Angra 1 plant is updated every 10 years, according to applicable standards - designer (American Project - are followed NRC requirements) and CNEN. NRC approves the use of ASME Section XI (In-service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components). The object of inservice inspection of components in nuclear power plants is to provide a continuing assurance that they are safe. To provide this assurance for those components that are subject to the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, a set of rules has been formulated to provide assurance that the functional requirements of the components are available when required. The rules have been arranged to provide appropriate levels of assurance according to the importance of the component in its relationship to plant safety. The classifications that are established during design and manufacturing have been adopted to provide the levels of importance for the components. The types of components typically found in the various classifications have then been identified and rules formulated for each type. For each type of component in each classification, the functions have been considered and methods of inspecting, testing, or monitoring each component is specified. These rules include methods of determining the limits of acceptance of the results. Should it be necessary to take corrective action to repair various components, rules have been provided to establish acceptable methods of repair or replacement. Angra 1 started the Renewal License and Long-term Operation project and there are three important Aging Management Programs (AMP) that are based on ASME section XI. This article will discuss the ASME section XI subsections that are important for the License Renewal and Long-term Operation for Angra 1. (author)
[en] Highlights: • Hazard and operability study suggests the pyroprocessing facility design strategies. • Hazards, operability issues, and off-normal situations are analyzed. • Proposed mitigation methods hinder severe accident scenarios. • Nuclear material accounting proposes implementation of a strong safeguards design. - Abstract: Pyroprocessing treats nuclear fuel using electrochemical techniques for a variety of applications, whether to process used uranium oxide fuel for back-end management, or to reprocess used metallic fuel for an advanced fuel concept. Since there are proliferation risks associated with special nuclear material (SNM) processed in a pyroprocessing facility, the high reliability safeguards (HRS) methodology has been developed to implement safeguards, safety, and physical security (3S) together with operations from a design-driven perspective. This paper suggests the design strategies by integrating a hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis. It is a process hazard analysis, essential for identifying hazards, operability issues, severe accident scenarios, and for mitigating consequences with the corresponding protection methods. It is a preliminary step for an eventual quantitative, probabilistic risk analysis, which may be needed for obtaining an operating license for a commercial pyroprocessing facility. The focus of this HAZOP analysis was on major pyroprocessing subsystems; voloxidation, electroreduction, electrorefining, electrowinning, and the argon atmosphere control system. Deviations were analyzed from normal operating conditions, and methods were thoroughly prepared to prohibit or mitigate off-normal situations. Importantly, pressure buildup or high temperature in the systems can increase the risk of initiating fire/explosion, which may eventually release radiation to the outside. Safety relief valve installations, valve actuation and heater automatic shutdown systems, etc., would be helpful to alleviate operational problems. This enhanced HAZOP also suggests a strong safeguards design for the facility by proposing nuclear material accounting (NMA) locations for the purpose of reducing potential proliferation risks.
[en] As an authorisation has been awarded in July 2018 for the construction of a new installation for uranium dioxide production through a new wet process on the ORANO Malvesi site, this report addresses impacts of this installation project. It presents the ORANO Malvesi site context within the nuclear fuel sectors (civil nuclear fuels such as enriched uranium, MOX), the characteristics of uranium dioxide production, its environmental and health impacts in comparison with current releases and emissions of this site, and the modalities of authorisation of uranium dioxide production
[en] As a result of the 13th amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (August 2011), 8 nuclear power plants have been permanently switched off. Since these nuclear power plants were not prepared for shutdown, applications for a permit to decommission the facilities at that time were not yet placed or prepared. Until the granting of the decommissioning permit, the following were found to be these installations with still valid operating licence, but without authorization for power operation, in an operating phase that also simplifies the "post-operational phase"- or "permanent non-power operation". In the first few years, for many of these facilities there was no sufficient number of transport and storage containers for spent fueld elements available at the site, so that this operating condition lasted a very long time. The long period between the completion of the operation and the granting of the decommissioning permit has not been considered in detail. For this period, therefore, there were no specific regulations. The safety and system availability for (longer-term) post-operation under consideration of the current requirements given by the German rules and regulations are sufficiently guaranteed. Likewise, the evaluation of the available operating experience of German nuclear power plants does not identify new findings with respect to the noted item list or the existing standards. Based on the evaluation according the state of the art in science and technology and the analyses carried out the available operating experience (reportable events and forwarding messages) German nuclear power plants, in the view of GRS, no new measures have to be taken. Based on the results of the evaluation of the operating experience, the following measures were taken probabilistic investigations. For the PWR and BWR plant under consideration the expected value for the fuel rod damage frequency was in the same order of magnitude as in the investigations on non-commercial operation. Also from the determined frequency of fuel rod damage there are no indications deficiencies. The safety systems available in post-operation and their redundancies appear as follows sufficient and adequate. In the installations under consideration, fires and earthquakes can cause the largest releases of activity from sources other than the nuclear fuel. However, the potential radiation exposure due to these events are, it is significantly lower than the exposure due to design basis accidents.
[de]Als Folge der 13. Novellierung des AtG (August 2011) wurden 8 Kernkraftwerke dauerhaft abgeschaltet. Da diese Kernkraftwerke nicht auf die Abschaltung vorbereitet waren, waren Anträge für eine Genehmigung zur Stilllegung der Anlagen zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch nicht gestellt oder vorbereitet. Bis zur Erteilung der Stilllegungsgenehmigung befanden sich diese Anlagen mit weiterhin gültiger Betriebsgenehmigung, aber ohne Berechtigung zum Leistungsbetrieb, in einer Betriebsphase, die auch vereinfacht „Nachbetriebsphase“ bzw. „dauerhafter Nichtleistungsbetrieb“ genannt wird. Für viele dieser Anlagen stand in den ersten Jahren keine ausreichende Anzahl von Transport- und Lagerbehältern für abgebrannte Brennelemente zur Verfügung, so dass dieser Betriebszustand sehr lange angedauert hat. Der lange Zeitraum zwischen der Beendigung des Leistungsbetriebes und der Erteilung der Stilllegungsgenehmigung war bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht detailliert betrachtet worden. Für diesen Zeitraum bestanden daher keine spezifischen Regelungen. Die Sicherheit und Systemverfügbarkeit für den (längerfristigen) Nachbetrieb sind unter Berücksichtigung der aktuell durch das deutsche Regelwerk gegebenen Anforderungen ausreichend gewährleistet. Ebenfalls lassen sich aus der Auswertung der vorliegenden Betriebserfahrungen deutscher Kernkraftwerke keine neuen Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der Merkpostenliste oder dem bestehenden Regelwerk selbst identifizieren. Aus den Recherchen zum Stand von Wissenschaft und Technik und der durchgeführten Analysen der vorliegenden Betriebserfahrungen (Meldepflichtige Ereignisse und Weiterleitungsnachrichten) deutscher Kernkraftwerke lassen sich aus Sicht der GRS keine zusätzlichen Maßnahmen ableiten. Aufbauend auf den erzielten Ergebnissen der Auswertung der Betriebserfahrung wurden probabilistische Untersuchungen durchgeführt. Für die betrachtete DWR- und SWRAnlage lag der Erwartungswert für die Brennstabschadenshäufigkeit in der gleichen Größenordnung wie bei den Untersuchungen zum Nichtleitungsbetrieb. Auch aus den ermittelten Brennstabschadenshäufigkeiten ergeben sich keine Hinweise auf Schwachstellen. Die im Nachbetrieb verfügbaren Sicherheitseinrichtungen und deren Redundanzen erscheinen ausreichend und angemessen. In den betrachteten Anlagen können Brände und Erdbeben zu den größten Aktivitätsfreisetzungen aus anderen Quellen als dem Kernbrennstoff führen. Die potenziellen Strahlenexpositionen sind bei diesen Ereignissen jedoch deutlich geringer als die vorgegebene Begrenzung der Exposition durch Störfälle.