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[en] Canadian regulations require that planning for decommissioning take place throughout a licensed facility's lifetime. As such, decommissioning plans and associated financial guarantees are updated and are required to be submitted to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to support licence conditions. The Financial Guarantee is supported by decommissioning funds that have been set aside for Ontario Power Generation's (OPG's) decommissioning liabilities. OPG has recently completed their decommissioning cost estimate update that is normally performed on a five year review cycle. OPG has adopted a nominal 30 year deferred decommissioning strategy for its' nuclear generating stations as its planned approach. This paper provides an overview of the improvements made to OPG's 2015 decommissioning cost estimates from the previous update performed in 2010 and the approach used. The technical assumptions and plans used in 2010 have been revised to include a more refined waste management strategy, incorporate recent Pickering safe storage planning assumptions and other important updates. This paper provides insight into the process used to validate the estimate and assumptions, challenges experienced, lessons learned and opportunities for future improvements to the estimate. (author)
[en] Recent events and trends point to a scenario of more and more reactors being retired due to economic viability reasons, post- Fukushima requirements, and a stalling of the general 'nuclear renaissance'. Such a trend is already happening in the United States and will likely also occur in other countries where older reactors are coming to an end of their original operating license periods or where regulators have imposed additional requirements. In terms of projections for the US, we have performed an analysis based on a plausible scenario that shows that as many as 25 reactors may enter decommissioning in the next twenty years, in addition to the reactors already in decommissioning. A significant change that is happening is that the power plants can no longer apply the SAFSTOR option and a 'wait and see' strategy. The main driver for this change is state intervention along with other factors including the status of the decommissioning funds, long-term liability issues, and a strong public interest in early dismantlement and cleanup. (authors)
[en] Indonesia has three Nuclear Reactors, specially research reactors which has operated for more than 20 years and the operating license will expired in the next few years. If the Licensee wants to extend the operating license for next period, one aspect that should be considered is ageing. This paper contains an overview of evaluation of ageing aspect in the operating license renewal for Nuclear Reactor. Literature study has been conducted on the requirements of operating license renewal for Nuclear Reactor determined in Government Regulation No. 2 year 2014 on Licensing for Nuclear Installation and Utilization of Nuclear Material, especially the documents related ageing aspect, such as Periodic Safety Review Report, Ageing Assesment Report and Ageing Management Program. The documents must be submitted to BAPETEN to be evaluated to ensure that the effects of ageing is managed well and effectively, so that all the necessary safety functions can be maintained over the life time of Nuclear Reactor (during operating license renewal). To support an implementation of these evaluation, BAPETEN should establish the work instructions for evaluation that containing a scope and acceptance criteria, as well as providing a human resources with competence and in-depth knowledge in the field of ageing aspects. The establishment of the work instruction refers to the provisions contained in the Regulations and IAEA guidance/Standards. (author)
[en] An example from the USA of the evaluation and implementation process for LTO is the Vermont Yankee NPP. The plant began operation in 1972, when the NRC issued a 40 year operating licence. In 2002, the plant was purchased by Entergy Nuclear and was being operated in a ‘merchant’ (or liberalized) market for electricity. At that time, the plant had operated for 30 years. The purchase deal included a ten year wholesale power purchase agreement that helped ensure a reasonable financial situation until 2012. In 2004, based on the economics of LTO where Vermont Yankee was located, it was determined that the cost of a licence renewal project to obtain the option of 60 years of operation was justified. The nuclear plant had been well maintained and no major equipment replacement or refurbishment was required to ensure safe and reliable operation for up to 60 years, as per the LRA . For example, from 2003 to 2006, the plant implemented plant upgrades to support a 20% power uprate, which helped further improve the economics of LTO. This meant more megawatts for approximately the same annual O&M costs. The upgrade also improved the material condition of significant portions of the plant (i.e. secondary system upgrades and replacements needed to allow 20% higher power levels). In 2011, the NRC granted a licence authorizing Vermont Yankee to operate for up to 60 years as long as the safety and environmental conditions of the licence were maintained. In 2012, the plant reached the 40 year milestone and was successfully operating beyond the original licence term (i.e. the period of extended operation) and was supplying more than 70% of the electricity generated in Vermont.
[en] Uranium solution mining is also called ISR (In-Situ Recovery) and ISL (In-Situ Leach) mining. In the United States there are only 3 states with a commercial level of ISR- Nebraska, Texas and Wyoming. This presentation outlines the history of ISR production in the US; the licensing process; the status of existing and new projects and licensing issues.
[en] The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) requires that all operators of licensed nuclear facilities in Canada prepare preliminary decommissioning plans that provide a basis for financial guarantees. Financial guarantees are updated on 3 to 5 year cycles. The CNSC has provided guidance for preparing preliminary decommissioning plans and financial guarantees in CNSC Regulatory Guides G-206, 'Financial Guarantees for the Decommissioning of Licensed Activities.'CNSC G-206 requires that the cost estimate provided for decommissioning fall within 10% to 30% accuracy range, as measured by contingency and in accordance with the American Institute of Cost Engineers and the Construction Industry Institute. In this presentation, we will consider the complexities of assessing the accuracy of a cost estimate and the challenges that are presented to decommissioning planning. A decommissioning cost estimate, in the context of CNSC Guide 206, is not based on a decommissioning plan that is ready for implementation in the short term. Commonly the facility decommissioning may not be expected within the next 50 years and only at the end of life of a facility. The combination of CNSC's periodic reporting requirement and changes at the facility over each reporting period results in an iterative decommissioning planning process where decommissioning cost estimates and their respective accuracy my vary significantly with time. This paper presents the fundamental building blocks required to prepare a decommissioning cost estimate and will elaborate on the variable levels of accuracy within a final submission. The paper sets realistic expectations for a CNSC submission. Fundamental concepts of how accuracy is measured are discussed. This paper focuses on how knowns and unknowns impact accuracy, contingency and risk in decommissioning or decommissioning cost estimating. It also suggests strategies for managing limitations of an estimate caused by limitations in quantifiable data. (author)
[en] Study has been done on the contents of Periodic Safety Review for Research Reactors. Periodic Safety Review Report is required by BAPETEN Chairman Regulation No. 2 Year 2011 on Safety of Non Power Reactor Operation, but there is no provision about the format and contents of this report. In this paper, the contents of Periodic Safety Review Report composed based on the NSG 2.10 and SSG 25. The result of this study propose important aspects that should be outlined in the Periodic Safety Review Report for Research Reactors: 1) Organization and Administration, 2) Procedures, 3) Status of Recent Safety Documents, 4) Operating Experience Feedback and Lessons Learned from Other Installations, 5) The Condition of SSCs, 6) Equipment Qualification, 7) Safety Performance, 8) Nuclear Preparedness Program, 9) Aging Management Program, 10) Radiation Protection Program, 11) System Management, 12) Data and Information of Personnel, and 13) Radioactive Effluents to The Environment and Radioactive Waste Management. Results of this study provide the proposed content of Periodic Safety Review Report for Research Reactor that is expected to facilitate the preparation of Periodic Safety Review Report by the operator and evaluation of the report by the regulator. (author)
[en] This publication describes the various approaches to the techno–economic assessment of a project for the long term operation of a nuclear power plant in its specific market environment. It examines the process of defining the technical scope required to prolong the operating licences of nuclear power plants and highlights the need for further studies on technical cost drivers and economic assessments in order to better define the cost boundaries of long term operation. Information is also provided on the new IAEA software LTOFIN, which was developed to assist in performing long term operation economic assessments within the process described in the publication.
[en] It is the current practice of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to expect the licensed operators to conduct a Periodic Safety Review (PSR) in support of the continued safe operation of their nuclear power facilities. One of the essential components of the PSR is the determination of the actual condition of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety, including the confirmation that the existing aging management arrangement will assure fitness for service (FFS) of these SSCs for the continued operation, and the presence of records demonstrating evidence that activities and actions are undertaken to maintain SSCs important to safety fit for service. This paper describes the regulatory expectations for the use of PSR in support of continued safe operation of a nuclear generating station. The paper specifically delineates the regulatory expectations regarding the necessary information required to maintain and report on the actual condition of SSCs important to safety, the arrangements (for example, programs, processes, procedures, instructions, tools) that the licensee must establish to maintain the FFS of these SSCs, and the database that supports the continual monitoring of the condition of these SSCs important to safety. Some lessons learned from the recent Canadian experience are presented and discussed.
[en] Posiva Oy is an expert organization established in 1995 and responsible for the final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel of its owners. Posiva currently employs around 100 people and has a turnover of some e63 million (2015). The company headquarters are located in Olkiluoto in the municipality of Eurajoki, Finland. Posiva is owned by two Finnish NPP operators Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (60%) (TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy (40%), both of which are responsible for their costs of nuclear waste management. The Finnish final disposal programme has a long history. When NPP unit Olkiluoto 1renewed its operating licence for the first time in 1983, TVO presented a programme showing final disposal to commence in the 2020s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the programme concentrated on concept development and site selection activities. After 2003, when Posiva received the decision in principle from the Finnish Government, a new phase began in the programme. Since 2004, Posiva Oy has constructed an underground rock characterization facility on the repository site in Olkiluoto, in western Finland. This facility, called ONKALO, has provided an opportunity to carry out further site investigations, develop construction techniques, and test and demonstrate the engineered barrier system in an actual repository environment. As a result of these investigations and development efforts, the application for a licence to construct the encapsulation plant and the geological repository was submitted in 2012. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland (STUK) first gave a positive review on the safety of the facility, and consequently the Finnish Government granted the construction licence in November 2015. (author)